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Abstract 
We provide an analysis of the 2008-2009 trade collapse using microdata from a small open economy, 
Belgium. First, we find that changes in firm-country-product exports and imports occurred mostly at 
the intensive margin: the number of firms, the average number of destination and origin markets per 
firm, and the average number of products per market changed only very little. Second, econometric 
analysis reveals some composition effects in the intensive margin fall along firm, product and country 
characteristics. The most important factor explaining changes in exports is the destination country's 
growth rate of GDP. Had growth rates in 2008{2009 been the same as in 2007{2008, Belgian exports 
would have fallen by about 57% less than what we observe. Trade in consumer durables and capital 
goods fell more severely than trade in other product categories, which explains another 22% of the 
observed fall. Financial variables and involvement in global value chains have some explanatory 
power on the exports and imports fall respectively, but appear to have affected domestic operations in 
equal proportion. More generally, exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios at the firm 
level did neither systematically decrease nor reveal strong firm- or sector-specific patterns. Overall, 
our results point to a demand-side explanation: the fall in trade was mostly driven by the fall in 
economic activity. It is not a trade crisis | just a trade collapse.  
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1 Introduction
World trade in manufactures fell by about 30% in nominal terms between the first quarter of 2008 and the
second quarter of 2009 (WTO, 2009). While some countries experienced sharp sectoral drops in their exports
or imports during the past, the current trade collapse is remarkably wide-ranging across industries and highly
synchronized across OECD countries (Arau´jo and Martins, 2009). It also substantially exceeds the fall in world
GDP. Though it is well known that trade is generally more responsive than GDP to macroeconomic shocks,
even when accounting for the long-term increase in the income elasticity of trade (Freund, 2009), computable
general equilibrium models and international real business cycle models significantly under-predict both the
magnitude and the speed of the current collapse (e.g., Benassy-Que´re´ et al., 2009; Levchenko et al., 2009).
Why was the fall in trade not commensurate with the recession? Many conjectures focus on the supply side
of trade: a dramatic trade credit crunch (Auboin, 2009; Chor and Manova, 2010); the widespread disruption of
global value chains (Yi, 2009);1 or protectionism raising its ugly head again (Evenett, 2009; Jacks et al., 2009).
All these conjectures point at a trade crisis — a crisis of the activity of trading across national boundaries per
se. Alternatively, other conjectures focus on the demand side of trade: a disproportionate fall in the demand
for tradable goods in most OECD countries (Eaton et al., 2010); or inventory adjustment (Alessandria et al.
2010) and the postponement of durable goods purchases. In principle, all these conjectures may play a role.
Only empirical analysis can allow us to discriminate between them.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a detailed microeconometric investigation of the deter-
minants of the trade collapse for a small open economy: Belgium. Matching Belgian data on the universe of
firm-country-product exports and imports with balance sheet information (and excluding entrepot trade) we
perform three empirical exercises. First, we decompose the trade collapse along the extensive and the intensive
margins as in Bernard et al. (2009). Intensive margin changes are defined as changes in average trade values
per firm-market-product, while the extensive margin refers to changes in the number of firms, destinations
and products. Second, we use our microdata to econometrically investigate the determinants of the fall in
trade in order to discriminate between the aforementioned conjectures. More precisely, we look at variations
in the changes in trade flows between the first semesters of 2008 and 2009 along firm, country, and product
characteristics. In other words, we identify the main drivers of the trade collapse through compositional
effects. Finally, we examine changes in exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios across firms.
1As pointed out by Freund (2009), among others, a fall in final demand in a world with fragmented production chains should
have a proportional impact on intermediate trade (disregarding input substitution or price changes). Increasing fragmentation
may explain the long-term rise of the trade elasticity with respect to GDP, but not its short-term rise during macroeconomic
crises. Evidence of the disruption of global value chains during recessions is required to explain higher short-term trade elasticities.
To the best of our knowledge such evidence is missing to date.
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Compositional effects in changes in these ratios would offer crucial evidence pointing to the main drivers of
the ‘trade crisis’. To the best of our knowledge no other study has until has analyzed the trade collapse using
firm-level data on trade and domestic operations.
Our key findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that virtually all of the trade collapse
occurred at the intensive margin. In other words, firm exit and the dropping of products and markets played
only a limited role relative to price adjustments and output scaling in explaining changes in trade values.
Furthermore, entry and exit dynamics during the crisis were not substantially different from those observed
in a ‘normal year’. This echoes findings by Bernard et al. (2009) on the 1997 Asian crisis, but is nonetheless
remarkable given the magnitude of the current trade collapse. Fears that the global economy could face a
major and potentially very long and costly trade crisis seem misplaced. We also find quite interesting patterns
in entrants’ and stayers’ export values, that would deserve investigation using truly dynamic export models.
Second, we isolate firm-, country- and product-specific components of the trade collapse by regressing
changes in trade values on observable firm, product and country characteristics using a multi-level clustering
approach. The single most important factor explaining changes in exports is the destination country’s growth
rate of GDP. Had growth rates in 2008S1–2009S1 counterfactually been the same as in 2007S1–2008S1, Belgian
exports would have fallen by about 57% less than what we observe. This result is quantitatively very close to
that of Eaton et al. (2010), despite a very different dataset and methodology. Another finding is that trade in
consumer durables and capital goods fell more severely than trade in other product categories. Had the fall in
demand across product categories been counterfactually identical, Belgian exports would have fallen by about
22% less than what we observe. The last finding to emerge from our analysis is that compositional effects
across firms are modest. The Belgian credit crunch2 seems to have affected exporters somewhat: differences in
indebtedness and debt maturity can explain up to 31% of the firm-level fall in exports. Similarly involvement
in global value chains can explain about 17% of the fall in imports. Last, we find a minor effect of inventory
adjustment on imports, and only in the distribution sector.
Finally, to assess whether international trade has been hit more strongly than production and domestic
activity, we regress exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios on firm characteristics and indus-
try dummies. Our econometric analysis reveals that there is almost no pattern across firms. In particular,
financial variables have no explanatory power. These results confirm that foreign operations were not signifi-
cantly differently affected than domestic operations — though exporters indeed suffered from restricted access
2According to the Central Corporate Credit Register of the National Bank of Belgium (nbb), authorized and used credit lines
in the Belgian manufacturing sector decreased by 4.40% and 3.11% respectively between June 2008 and June 2009. Furthermore
lending through letters of credit, typically used in international transactions, decreased by 5.18% over the same period.
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to credit, their domestic and foreign sales were equally affected. Similarly involvement in global value chain
did not have any significant effect on imports-to-intermediates ratios. Supply-side conjectures have therefore
considerably less explanatory power when comparing foreign to domestic operations.
Overall our results suggest that a general fall in demand for tradables, especially for consumer durables
and capital goods, is mainly responsible for the recent trade collapse. Since trade and domestic activity were
affected in roughly similar ways, talk of a ‘trade crisis’ appears to be inappropriate.
Related literature. Firstly, our paper is quite naturally closely related to ongoing empirical investigations
of the trade collapse. Baldwin (2009), which includes a large survey of empirical studies of the trade collapse,
concludes in favor of demand-side explanations. Most studies rely on aggregate data or descriptives, although
some decompose the margins of US and French trade, with results similar to ours. Closer to our work,
Bricongne et al. (2009) provide a careful examination of monthly French firm-level exports. They find a
dominant role for the intensive margin, with little difference across exporter size classes but a more severe fall
in sectors that depend more on external finance. They do not, however, systematically exploit balance sheet
data to link export changes to firm-level characteristics. Levchenko et al. (2009) examine the variation in US
exports and imports across 6-digit industries. They find some support for the ‘fragmentation explanation’
and some role for durable goods, but no evidence of a trade credit effect or of inventory adjustments. They
also find that industries experiencing larger reductions in domestic output had a larger fall in trade. Chor
and Manova (2010) find significant composition effects in US imports using variation over time, interbank
interest rates (across origin countries) and financial characteristics (across sectors). However due to data
limitations they evaluate financial characteristics at the industry level (potentially mis-measuring attributes
of the subset of exporting firms) and industrial production indices at the country level. Finally, Eaton et al.
(2010) calibrate the Eaton-Kortum model on bilateral trade data for 30 countries. They find that a global
demand shock, especially for durables, can explain most of the trade fall. Interestingly they find orders of
magnitude of demand shocks that are very comparable to ours. We view our results as complementary to
theirs. They also examine several explanations, but using the structure of a trade model while abstracting
from cross-industry and cross-firm patterns, while we do the opposite. They also find some role for implicit
bilateral trade frictions, as proxied by Head and Ries (2001) indices, in countries such as China and Japan.
Secondly, our work is related to studies of changes in trade patterns during major macroeconomic crises.
Bernard et al. (2009) investigate the contributions of the different margins of trade to changes in US exports
to, and imports from, several Asian countries during the 1997 financial crisis. They find that most of the
adjustments occurred at the intensive margin, thus favoring a quick subsequent recovery. Amiti and Weinstein
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(2009) find that shocks to the health of exporters’ main banks (related to Japan’s real estate crisis in the
1990’s) explain up to half of changes in firm-level exports, controlling for industry-time fixed effects. They do
not find any effect of bank health on domestic sales. Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) use a difference-in-difference
approach to show that past financial crises caused a greater decrease in exports among firms that depended
to a larger extent on trade credit. Berman and Martin (2009) show in a gravity framework that countries that
use trade finance have larger bilateral export declines in times of financial or currency crises. Alessandria et
al. (2010) calibrate a model of inventory adjustment using data on the US car industry and aggregate US
data. Their model generates a fall in trade in excess of 33% of the fall in output, in line with the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines some broad facts about the current
collapse and its impact on Belgium. Section 3 decomposes the trade collapse along various margins and along
various country, product, and firm dimensions. Section 4 presents an econometric model to disentangle the
contribution of firm, product and country characteristics to the observed changes in the intensive margin.
Section 5 examines composition effects in exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediate purchases ratios.
Section 6 discusses what can be learned from our exercise. Details concerning data sources, as well as the
description and construction of variables, are relegated to Appendix A. Tables and Figures referred to in the
main text are found in AppendixC. Details on robustness checks are provided in Appendix D.
2 The collapse of Belgian production and trade: an aggregate snapshot
We dissect the fall in trade using data from a small open economy, Belgium. Using Belgian data has several
advantages. First, given its small size, international shocks are reasonably exogenous to Belgium. Second,
changes in Belgian GDP and trade were remarkably synchronized with those of other European Union (EU)
countries, thus suggesting that the Belgian experience may apply more broadly. Last, very high export and
import shares of sales and purchases, respectively, make the ‘super trader’ Belgium an ideal laboratory to
study the impacts of the crisis on vertical specialization and global value chains.3 Using Belgian data has,
however, the drawback of including a large amount of re-exports. Indeed, Belgium (in particular Antwerp) is
a key port of entry to and exit from the EU. Many ‘Belgian’ firms thus trade exclusively with non-resident
partners. We deal with this potential problem in two ways. First, we exploit the information gathered by
the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) since 2001 and systematically exclude trade by firms being identified
3According to the World Bank WDI database, Belgian merchandise imports and exports amounted jointly to 187% of Belgian
GDP in 2007.
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as non-resident.4 Second, we control for a firm’s industry in our regressions. Doing so should largely capture
the remaining re-exports which are concentrated on wholesalers’ and retailers’ foreign trade.
We first provide an aggregate snapshot of the Belgian trade collapse. Figure 1 shows that a dramatic
decrease of imports and exports is visible in the data from November 2008 onwards, with monthly merchandise
exports and imports falling by about 10% relative to their value a year before. The situation deteriorates until
January 2009, when it stabilizes at a steady lower level until the end of our data coverage period (June 2009).
Furthermore the Figure reveals seasonal fluctuations. For these reasons we will focus throughout the paper
on a comparison between the first semesters of 2008 and 2009 (henceforth, 2008S1 and 2009S1). Exports and
imports of goods by Belgian residents fell by 26.23% and 27.77%, respectively, between these two periods.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Differences across product categories. An important finding from previous studies using aggregate data
(e.g., Baldwin, 2009) is that the trade collapse has not been uniform across products. Belgium is no exception:
as shown in Table 1, we observe large differences in export and import changes across broad product categories,
despite the absence of special fiscal stimulus packages during the period we consider.5 Trade in intermediates
and consumer durables fell much more dramatically than trade in other categories, energy being an exception.
These aggregate statistics seem to lend credence to explanations based on the disruption of global value chains
or the postponement of durable goods and equipment purchases.
Insert Table 1 about here.
Table 2 provides a finer breakdown of the trade collapse across 2-digit Prodcom-2008 codes.6 As can be
seen from the figures, trade in nearly all broad product categories fell, though in a very heterogeneous way.
As for exports, ‘Other mining and quarrying’ and ‘Manufacture of basic metals’ suffered the largest drops of
nearly 50%, while a few other categories like ‘Printing and reproduction of recorded media’, ‘Manufacture of
basic pharmaceutical products and preparations’ and ‘Manufacture of other transport equipment’ saw their
exports increase during the period. A similar pattern also holds for imports.
4Non-resident firms are the main re-exporters. They are identified by the Belgian customs using information from VAT
declarations. Firms with a Belgian VAT identifier that have a foreign legal address and firms offering fiscal representation services
to foreign firms are considered by default as non-resident. Non-residents must report how much they trade with residents (domestic
trade) and non-residents (re-exports) in VAT declarations. They are classified as ‘pure’ non-residents if they are not involved in
any trade transactions with residents, and as ‘mixed’ non-residents otherwise (which is the default category, firms must apply to
get pure non-resident status). Non-resident firms are not compelled to file balance sheets. Non-resident foreign trade accounted
for about 26% of Belgian exports and 22% of Belgian imports in 2008. The figures for 2009 are 28% and 25%, respectively.
5See Appendix A for more information about product grouping using the EU Main Industrial Groupings classification.
6The Prodcom classification, and in particular the 2008 version, is an hybrid product/activity classification used in the EU as
a bridge between the main traded product classification (the CN8 nomenclature) and the main activity classification (NACE).
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Insert Table 2 about here.
Foreign and domestic operations. In line with developments in other OECD countries, Belgian trade
fell much more than GDP. Across all goods, the fall of about 26% in exports and 28% in imports must be
contrasted with a ‘modest’ 3.25% fall in nominal GDP over the same period. However, since it involves
essentially manufactured goods, trade is not value added so that the fall in trade should be compared with the
fall in manufacturing production value. Restricting the analysis to those goods for which data on production
is available from the Prodcom dataset, the fall of about 25% in exports and 24% in imports closely mimics
the roughly 25% fall in manufacturing production value over the same period.7 Hence, in the aggregate the
fall in trade was commensurate with the fall in manufacturing production, as can be further seen from Figure
2.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
Restricting ourselves again to goods for which data on production is available, Figure 2 reports monthly
changes in the export-to-production and import-to-production ratios from January 2005 to June 2009. The
figure confirms the absence of a strong differential trend between production and trade for Belgium: if any-
thing, it points to an increase (rather than a decrease) of these measures. At the 2-digit product level, Table 2
further compares those same two ratios using data for 2008S1 and 2009S1. Inspection of the table reveals
that the aggregate results depicted in Figure 2 also hold within broad product categories.
Geographical structure of the trade collapse. Table 3 breaks down changes in total Belgian exports
plus imports with its top-100 trading partners between 2008S1 and 2009S1. On the one hand, trade with the
Netherlands (Belgium’s most important trading partner) fell by 31.83%. Trade with other major EU partners
(Germany, France, UK, Italy) as well as with Japan, Korea and the US fell by roughly similar magnitudes.
On the other hand, trade with China and Hong Kong, the GDP of which kept growing during the period, was
much less affected. While there does not seem to be any clear geographical structure in trade flow changes,
GDP growth could be a promising dimension to explore.8
Insert Table 3 about here.
7See Appendix A for further details on the Prodcom dataset. Based on that dataset, manufacturing production volumes fell
by 18%, while manufacturing production value fell by 25%. These statistics are consistent with the small changes in overall
exports-to-production and imports-to-production ratios presented in Table 2. Observe also that the overall change in prices and
quantities is roughly comparable to the one of aggregate trade presented in Section 3 below.
8The suspiciously large growth of trade with Ireland might be related to abusive transfer pricing given that that Ireland’s
corporate tax rate is substantially lower than Belgium’s.
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Summary of the aggregate snapshot. Belgian exports and imports fell faster than GDP but roughly
commensurate with manufacturing production value. The fall in trade showed substantial variation across
product categories, with particularly strong drops in ‘Consumer durables’ and ‘Capital goods’. To some
extent, it also varied across origin and destination markets: trade with EU partners, Japan and the US was
more affected than trade with China and Hong Kong.
Aggregate descriptive evidence at the product, sector or country level is useful to gauge the magnitude
of the trade collapse but is insufficient to provide a compelling explanation for its cause(s). Firms are the
basic units that trade products across countries, and aggregate data may lead to misleading conclusions by
masking compositional effects. Table 2 suggests, for example, that exports have decreased more for some
product categories than for others, but this may be due to particular problems faced by firms selling these
products or the markets in which they are traded instead of the goods’ attributes themselves. Broad product
groups, which contain hundreds of products, might also hide substantial heterogeneity within categories.
To deal with these problems, we therefore now take the analysis to finer levels of disaggregation. In Section
3 we first decompose the contribution of the different margins of trade to the trade collapse, using exports
and imports at the firm-product-country level. The key findings from this analysis will guide us in specifying
an econometric model in Section 4 to separately identify the magnitude and significance of firm-, country-
and product-level determinants of the fall in trade. Section 5 then compares domestic and foreign operations
to assess whether the trade collapse is driven by a generalized fall in demand for manufacturing goods, or
whether the ‘smoking gun’ must be sought elsewhere.
3 The margins of the trade collapse
To gauge each margin’s contribution to the Belgian trade collapse, we perform a decomposition of changes in
exports and imports along the lines suggested by Bernard et al. (2009).
3.1 The extensive and intensive margins
Belgian exports X in a given time period can be decomposed as X = f c g x, where f , c and g denote the
the number of exporters, the average number of countries each exporter sells to, and the average number of
products each exporter ships to each country, respectively; and where x ≡ X/(f c g) are average sales per
exporter-country-product. Defining ∆X ≡ X ′/X, where X ′ refers to exports in another period, and applying
this ∆ transformation to the other variables, we may decompose the change in Belgian exports between 2008S1
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and 2009S1 as follows:
∆X = ∆f ∆c∆g∆x, (1)
Changes in the first three terms of expression (1) are referred to as changes in the extensive margin of trade,
while changes in the last term are referred to as changes in the intensive margin.9 Information about physical
quantities exported allows us to further decompose changes in the intensive margin into changes in average
quantities (q) and in average prices (p): ∆x ≡ ∆q∆p. We provide more detailed information about how this
latter decomposition is implemented in Appendix A. The change in imports, ∆M , can be decomposed in the
same way.
Insert Table 4 about here.
As mentioned earlier Belgian exports for all firm-country-product combinations fell by about 26% between
2008S1 and 2009S1. Table 4 reveals that despite that huge fall, the number of exporters and the number of
products shipped on average by each exporter to each country increased by 0.96% and by 0.16%, respectively.
The average number of countries served by Belgian exporters dropped by -1.92%. Changes at the extensive
margin hence decreased Belgian exports by (1.0096× 0.9808× 1.0016− 1)× 100% = −0.82%. As can be seen
from Column 6 in Table 4, changes at the extensive margin are dwarfed by changes at the intensive margin.
Indeed, the average value of exports per firm-country-product fell by 25.63% between 2008S1 and 2009S1.
Thus, as can be seen from the last line, the intensive margin contributes to more than 97% of the observed
change in exports, whereas the contribution of the extensive margin is less than 3%.10
One distinct advantage of our dataset is that it provides information on either quantities or weights of
shipments for each firm-country-product observation. This allows us, as mentioned before, to decompose the
change in export values more finely into quantity and price changes.11 As can be seen from the last two
columns of Table 4, changes in the intensive margin are mainly driven by changes in quantities shipped. On
average, Belgian exports by firm-country-product decreased in terms of quantities by 20%. Average unit prices
also fell, but ‘only’ by 7.04%. A first conclusion thus emerges: the collapse of Belgian exports is overwhelmingly
driven by a fall in sales per firm-country-product, itself driven to a large extent by a sharp fall in quantities
9We have no information on the number of trading partners or shipments for each exporter per country-product combination.
Thus, our intensive margin ∆x still contains ‘extensive margin’ components that we cannot isolate.
10Combining the two margins of trade, the total change in Belgian exports is given by (1.0096 × 0.9808 × 1.0016 × 0.7437 −
1)× 100% = −26.23%. Letting EM and IM denote the extensive and the intensive margins, this total change can be expressed as
∆X = ∆IM × ∆EM. Using logarithms, we compute the relative contribution of the intensive and the extensive margins to the
total change in trade as ln(∆IM)/ln(∆X) and ln(∆EM)/ln(∆X), respectively.
11For the finer decomposition using changes in quantities and in prices, the total change in exports is decomposed as (1.0096×
0.9808 × 1.0016 × 0.8 × 0.9296 − 1) × 100% = −26.23%, where the last two terms in the decomposition are the changes in the
average quantity and the average price, respectively.
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exported and some decrease in unit prices.
Insert Table 5 about here.
Table 5 performs the same decomposition for total Belgian imports, which fell by about 28% across all
firm-country-product combinations between 2008S1 and 2009S1. Observe that the overall picture is very
similar to that of exports, although there is even slightly less change at the extensive margin. There seems
to be some ‘downsizing’ in terms of the average number of countries and the average number of products per
country each firm imports, but this is almost completely offset by more firms importing. As can be seen from
the last two columns and the last line in Table 5, the intensive margin accounts again for almost all the change
in imports and most of it is driven by a sharp decrease in quantities. A second conclusion thus emerges: the
collapse of Belgian imports is overwhelmingly driven by a fall in imports per firm-country-product, itself driven
to a large extent by a sharp fall in quantities imported and some decrease in unit prices.
To gauge whether the trade collapse, visible in Tables 4 and 5, roughly affects all firms, sectors, and
trading partners equally, we also repeat the above decompositions by splitting our sample more finely along
various dimensions.
Insert Table 6 about here.
For example Table 6 presents results for different product categories. The overall decomposition of margins,
while not identical, remains qualitatively very similar. In particular, the intensive margin remains dominant
whereas changes at the extensive margin are small. In the same spirit we split our sample in subgroups of
origin and destination countries, firm size and productivity, nationality of ownership, and debt structure.
Results, which are qualitatively very similar, are relegated to Appendix B.
To summarize, the most striking and robust feature to emerge from our data is that the ‘full extensive
margin’ (i.e., the number of firms times the number of countries per firm times the number of products per
country-firm) is extremely stable, both for imports and exports. This result continues to hold true when we
decompose the sample into various subgroups as shown in Appendix B. Put differently, almost all of the
action takes place at the intensive margin, with virtually no change occurring at the extensive margin. This
finding firstly highlights the extreme flexibility of firms, of their input suppliers, and of their clients. Secondly,
negligible changes at the extensive margin, even in the wake of a major shock, suggest that sunk costs are
an extremely important component of trade costs. If trade costs were recoverable (either variable or fixed)
we should have seen a massive contraction at the extensive margin with firms exiting markets and severing
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trade relations to cut losses. Thirdly, our findings also suggest that trade should pick up again rapidly as the
recession fades and as the macroeconomic environment returns to normal.12
3.2 Firm dynamics and the trade collapse
Table 11 shows that about 98% of both 2008S1 and 2009S1 exports were accounted for by ‘stayers’ — firms
that were exporting in both semesters. The remaining share in 2008 was due to ‘exiters’ — firms that exported
in 2008S1 but not in 2009S1. The remaining share in 2009S1 was accounted for by ‘entrants’ — firms that
exported in 2009S1 but not in 2008S1. Table 11 further reveals that the 2007S1–2008S1 patterns were very
similar, thus suggesting that 2008S1–2009S1 was not exceptional in terms of firm dynamics. Despite slightly
more exit from and slightly less entry into foreign trade, and a smaller export share of entrants during the
crisis, the overall pattern is not very different from the one in 2007S1–2008S1. In particular, there is still
a large turnover and little net entry despite the crisis. Finally, the observed patterns also broadly hold for
imports.
Insert Table 11 about here.
The absence of massive exit from foreign trade during a major crisis is striking. This finding gives further
support to dynamic trade models with sunk entry costs (e.g., Das et al., 2007). The fact that almost all firms
remain active traders during a period where trade contracts by 25% can be explained by the option value of
staying in the presence of these sunk entry costs. Of course, an alternative explanation could be that firms
expected a short crisis.
Insert Table 12 about here.
Table 12 summarizes a related margin decomposition where we compare trade of the 2008S1 and 2009S1
cohorts of stayers, entrants and exiters. In the case of exports, it reveals some interesting facts that can be
related to recent models of export dynamics. Comparing across cohorts, 2009S1 entrants and exiters fared
much worse than the previous cohort (a 77% decrease in export values). Meanwhile, 2009S1 stayers fared worse
than the previous cohort, partly including the same firms, but less dramatically so (about 27% decrease in
export values). This finding is at odds with Melitz-type models, where a common demand shock should affect
entrants and stayers identically. Part of the explanation involves compositional effects through differences
in entrants’ number of products and countries served. Table 12 shows clearly that entrants are much more
12In April 2010, Belgian monthly imports and exports were already back to their April 2008 level.
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strongly affected at the extensive margin than stayers. Nonetheless the magnitude of the gap between entrants
and stayers suggests that something else is at work. Overall a more sophisticated dynamic trade model is
necessary to explain why entry remained stable but 2009S1 entrants exported much less than the previous
cohort and than stayers (as can be seen from Tables 11 and 12). In fact this finding could help to discriminate
between the various mechanisms suggested by the recent literature.13 We leave this task for future research
as it goes beyond the scope of this paper.
In the case of imports, we find that entry remained stable but more exit occurred. There were considerably
more exiters than in the previous cohort, but the increase was offset by an equally considerable fall in average
imports. Average imports of exiters fell by about as much as those of stayers. Overall, the rise in the number
of importers during the trade collapse was dwarfed by the fall in the intensive margin, as noted earlier, but it
would deserve further investigation.
While our descriptive exercises already highlight several important insights, they are not suited to identify
the magnitudes, significance and contribution of the different determinants of the trade fall. We therefore
next turn to econometric analysis, taking full advantage of our firm-country-product trade data and balance
sheet data.
4 Firm-, country-, and product-level characteristics: the determinants of
the trade collapse
The previous Section showed that the bulk of the fall in Belgian trade occurred at the intensive margin.
Therefore we can safely analyze the determinants of the trade collapse by focusing solely on the intensive
margin, i.e. firm-country-product transaction values. As further seen in the previous section, 98% of 2008S1
and 2009S1 exports were accounted for by stayers. Given the overwhelming contribution of stayers to export
and import values, we can explore the determinants of the fall in trade by restricting the analysis to these
firms.14
In this Section we aim to quantify the contribution of the various conjectures put forth in the literature,
by looking at the composition of the fall in trade along the firm, product and country dimensions. If, say,
13Recent work on firm-level export dynamics builds on several mechanisms to explain export dynamics at the intensive and
extensive margins: serially correlated permanent shocks to TFP, credit or capacity constraints, uncertainty about demand or
costs, search and learning dynamics, reputation-building, endogenous R&D investment or quality upgrading.
14Observe that such an analysis would be flawed in the presence of large changes at the extensive margin. Had the number
of exporting firms drastically fallen, we would have needed to analyze the determinants of export participation before and after
the collapse (by using, for example, a probit approach). The stability of the extensive margin across firm, products and markets
allows us to neglect these determinants in the analysis as they are of second-order importance.
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highly leveraged firms experienced a greater fall in trade (conditional on other firm characteristics as well as
on the characteristics of their products and destination markets) we can infer that restricted access to credit
played a role in explaining the trade collapse. Furthermore, we can then try to gauge its magnitude on the
observed fall in trade.
4.1 An econometric model of changes in trade values
The primary data for our regression analysis consists in export and import values by firm-country-product
in 2008S1 and 2009S1, for stayers only. We aggregate data to the HS4 product level (more than 1,000
product categories) and consider only ‘continuing transactions’, i.e. firm-country-product trade triples that
record positive values in both semesters. The aim is to provide econometric results that can make sense
of aggregate changes in trade. Focusing on continuing transactions avoids giving too much weight to low-
value transactions (most discontinuous transactions are low value) while allowing for meaningful multi-level
clustering of the standard errors. 15
We describe the econometric model we use for exports, the model for imports being identical. Using data
on continuous transactions only, we regress the change in log export values ∆Xicp ≡ logX2009icp − logX2008icp on
firm, country and product characteristics that proxy for the various conjectures put forward to explain the
trade collapse. Formally, the estimating equation is given by:
∆Xicp = α+Wiβ + ηs + Zcγ + Spζ + icp (2)
where icp, is a residual term having the standard properties for the consistency of OLS, ηs is a sector
fixed effect (two digit NACE classification rev 1.1)16, and Wi, Zc and Sp denote firm, country, and product
characteristics, respectively. In the case of firm covariates, we use lagged information from 2007 balance sheets
to avoid endogeneity of firm characteristics (such as productivity, employment, and financial structure) with
respect to the trade collapse. Having data varying along three dimensions we follow the procedure of Cameron
et al. (2006) and apply multi-level clustering to obtain more reliable standard errors.
15By definition, continuing transactions are a subset of stayers’ transactions. They account for the lion’s share of trade values
in both 2008S1 and 2009S1. More precisely, there were 272,216 continuing transactions out of the 433,529 (430,000) export
transactions in 2008S1 (2009S1), thus corresponding to 62.79% (63.31%) of the number of total transactions and to 93.66%
(91.83%) of total transaction values. The observed fall in the value of continuing export transactions between 2008S1 and 2009S1
is 27.48%, which is quite close to the 26.23% decrease recorded for all export transactions. As for imports, there were 331,981
continuing transactions out of the 560,258 (559,530) transactions in 2008S1 (2009S1), thus corresponding to 59.26% (59.33%) of
the number of total transactions and to 92.83% (90.47%) of total transaction values. The observed fall in the value of continuing
import transactions between 2008S1 and 2009S1 is 29.57%, which again closely matches the 27.77% decrease recorded for all
import transactions.
16The NACE rev 1.1 is the main industry classification in the European Community. It draws extensively on the ISIC rev 3.
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Equation (2) constitutes an econometric model of change in trade values that is likely to remain valid
outside the trade collapse period. When considering changes in trade between two ‘normal’ semesters one
would expect that, for example, the productivity of a firm and/or the GDP growth of the destination country,
the latter proxing for changes in aggregate demand, would matter in explaining changes in trade values. To
identify what is peculiar to the 2008S1–2009S1 trade collapse we compare estimates obtained from (2) in a
‘normal’ period with those obtained during the collapse. To this end, we also estimate (2) using changes in
trade values of continuing transactions between 2007S1 and 2008S1.17
Insert Table 13 about here.
Table 13 summarizes the list of covariates we use in (2). All firm characteristics prefixed by D- are binary
variables, taking value 1 if a particular characteristic is above the sectoral median across all trading firms
and 0 otherwise. Doing so allows us to maximize the number of firms we can include in the analysis while
reducing the risk of bias due to measurement error and potential outliers. It also provides us, as in the case
of standardized regression coefficients, with a relevant metric to compare the contribution of the different
firm characteristics to changes in trade values. Last but not least, the binary specification is able to broadly
account for non-linear effects of the covariates. As a robustness check, we also ran the same regressions with
all variables in continuous form and provide standardized coefficients. The results, reported in Appendix D,
are qualitatively identical. In what follows, we thus present the results using the binary variables.
4.2 Results
Table 14 reports coefficients and standard errors obtained by estimating (2) by OLS for 2008S1–2009S1 (left
panel, ‘Into the collapse’) and for 2007S1–2008S1 (right panel, ‘Before the collapse’). Considering the former
period, we have 204,598 (out of 272,216) continuing export transactions for which all data on firm, country,
and product characteristics is available. These transactions represent 69.50% of 2008S1 export values and
68.41% of 2009S1 export values. The fall in export values between 2008S1 and 2009S1 corresponding to these
transactions is 27.21%, which is very close to the 27.48% export decrease for all continuing transactions.
Overall, the data covers 6,959 firms, 170 countries, and 1,075 HS4 products. As for imports, we have 255,035
(out of 331,981) continuing import transactions for which all the data is available. These transactions represent
70.47% of 2008S1 import values and 67.62% of 2009S1 import values. The fall in import values between 2008S1
17To ensure consistency data used to construct firm-level variables and NACE dummies come from 2006 balance sheet and
trade data. GDP growth and exchange rate variables are lagged by one year relative to the 2008S1-2009S1 regressions.
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and 2009S1 corresponding to these continuing transactions is 30.66%, in line with the 29.57% import decrease
for all continuing transactions. Overall, the data covers 13,545 firms, 148 countries, and 1,099 HS4 products.
One may a priori worry about potential biases that arise because we have to drop a number of continuing
transactions for which data is missing. However, balance sheet data are missing mainly for Belgian affiliates
of foreign groups that do no exist as a separate legal entity in Belgium. Such firms are not required to report
unconsolidated accounts even if they are technically considered as residents by Belgian customs.18 Including
these firms in the analysis would have been desirable, but a positive aspect of dropping them is that they
are likely to engage in substantial amounts of re-exports. Altogether our focus on Belgian residents only, the
exclusion of the above-mentioned firms, and the inclusion of industry fixed effects represent a very conservative
way of dealing with the issue of re-exports.
Insert Table 14 about here.
Firm characteristics. In general Table 14 shows that firm-level characteristics are rarely significant, that
most coefficients are very small, and that the model’s explanatory power is very weak. Table 15 also shows
that there is no evident problem of colinearity among our firm-level variables. Our results thus suggest that:
(i) the trade collapse has been quite symmetric across firms within a given industry; (ii) some of the supply-
side explanations of the trade collapse clearly play at best a second-order role. For example consider a firm’s
reliance on external finance, following the measure proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), Dext fin dep. The
−0.0291 coefficient in the second column of Table 14, though highly significant, means that imports of firms
with above-median reliance on external finance fell by 2.91 percentage points more during the crisis than
those of below-median firms. The magnitude is rather small relative to the overall fall in imports of 27.77%,
and comparable to that of the coefficient of −0.0256 in a ‘normal’ period such as 2007S1–2008S1. Given
the estimated standard errors, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the ‘crisis coefficient’ is not significantly
different from the coefficient in a ‘normal’ period.
Insert Table 15 about here.
We now discuss results for each group of covariates. Large or productive firms’ exports grew no faster
than other firms’ exports, unlike in the previous year. This confirms our margin decomposition of Section 3,
with the additional insight that neither firm, nor country or product composition effects are to blame.
Involvement in global value-added chains (as measured by Dinterm share, Dshare exp sales, Dshare imp interm,
and Dvalue add chain) did not seem to matter more for exports in 2008S1–2009S1 than in 2007S1–2008S1.
18In addition, some small firms are not compelled to file balance sheets. See Appendix A for further details on both subjects.
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This casts doubt on the hypothesis of a disruption of global value chains (Yi, 2009). Observe further that
Dshare imp interm is not significant for export growth into the collapse, while it was negative and significant
before, the opposite of what the hypothesis actually would suggest. The import growth regression delivers a
more complex message. On the one hand, Dshare imp interm and Dvalue add chain have negative and significant
coefficients, as the hypothesis would suggest, but the coefficients were almost identical in the 2007S1-2008S1
regression! They may therefore capture a longer-term trend in imports of intermediate-intensive firms. On
the other hand, Dinterm share and Dshare exp sales have negative and significant coefficients in 2008S1-2009S1
but not 2007S1-2008S1, and of a low magnitude: above-median firms’ import growth differed by 6 percentage
points in total. To further assess this magnitude, we predict counterfactual import growth in the absence
of involvement in global value chains, i.e., when Dinterm share and Dshare exp sales equal zero, all else equal.
We find that 17.29% of the overall import fall would not have occurred in this counterfactual world. Finally,
foreign ownership and multinational status dummies are not significant. Summarizing, we find little evidence
of a disruption of global value chains causing the trade collapse. Differences in the intensity of intermediate
imports or exports do not account for the export fall, and account for at most 17.29% of the import fall.
Differences in multinational status have strictly no explanatory power.
Variables proxying for firms’ financial structure (Dext fin dep, Dshare debts o liab, Dshare debts due after one,
Dshare fin debt) appear to play some role in 2008S1–2009S1 export changes. Firms with shorter debt maturity
and a larger fraction of financial (as opposed to commercial) debt experienced a substantially larger fall
of exports into the trade collapse. By contrast, the coefficients are not significant in the 2007S1–2008S1
regressions. Our findings thus lend some support to the trade credit crunch hypothesis (Auboin, 2009; Chor
and Manova, 2010). How large is that effect? Firms with above-median debt maturity experienced a 5.6
percentage point higher export growth, whereas firms with above-median financial debts saw their exports
shrink by about 4.6 percentage points more. Both values must be compared with the 26.23% total fall in
export values. To further assess the magnitude, we predict the counterfactual export growth in the absence
of negative financial effects, i.e., when Dshare debts due after one equals one and Dshare fin debt equals zero, all
else equal. We find that about one-third (31.33%) of the 2008S1-2009S1 fall in exports can be attributed to
finance. It is worth noting, however, that financial variables do not seem to affect changes in import values
at all. Furthermore, almost no financial variable is significant in the regressions with continuous variables
presented as a robustness check in Appendix D.19
The coefficient for Dshare stock, proxying for inventory capacity, is not significant for imports in both
19As in most related work, our variables only imperfectly capture access to credit in general and trade finance in particular.
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regressions. This contrasts with the inventory adjustment explanation (Alessandria et al., 2010): we would
have expected imports of firms with greater inventory capacity to contract more, all else equal. In fact only
the coefficient in the 2008S1–2009S1 export growth regression is significant, and with a positive sign! Firms
with higher inventory-to-sales ratios contracted exports by less, which might reflect differences in access to
working capital rather than inventory strategies. Still, it may be argued that inventory adjustments occur
primarily among distributors. Therefore we also run the same regressions on a subsample comprising firms
from the distribution sector only (NACE industries 50, 51 and 52), which represented 40.25% of Belgian
imports in 2008S1.20 We find that imports of distributors with above-median inventory-sales ratios fell by
2.75 percentage points more than other distributors in 2008S1-2009S1. This coefficient can account for 10.82%
of the import fall of the distribution sector, using the counterfactual technique mentioned earlier. However
we find no effects of stocks in the earlier period, or in the export growth regressions. Overall we conclude
that although inventory adjustment accounted for some of the import fall in an important sector, it played a
minor role in the trade collapse.
Country characteristics. We view GDP growth as the key variable to gauge the contribution of a demand
shock to the collapse of exports. Two results stand out from our analysis. First, the coefficient differs widely
between 2007S1–2008S1 and 2008S1–2009S1. In a ‘normal year’, the coefficient of log export change with
respect to the trading partners’ percentage GDP growth is around one percent (0.0138). This means that a
1% increase in the aggregate demand of a given country, as proxied by its percentage GDP growth, translates
into a 1.38% increase in export values to that destination. To the extent that such an increase in exports reflects
a proportional change in the demand for tradable goods, our coefficient is broadly consistent with standard
cross-section/cross-country gravity models in which the coefficient for the GDP of the export destination is
close to unity. However, during the trade collapse, the responsiveness of changes in log export values with
respect to percentage GDP changes of the importing countries increased significantly (0.0253), thus suggesting
that the global recession induced a disproportionate fall in the demand for tradable goods. Using our model
to evaluate the counterfactual situation in which GDP growth rates for 2008S1–2009S1 are replaced with the
rates prevailing in 2007S1–2008S1, all else equal, delivers the result that the export drop would have been
57.14% less. We may thus conclude that about 60% of the export collapse can be attributed to a generalized
fall in the demand for tradable goods. These results are very similar to those of Eaton et al. (2010), though
both approaches use very different data and methodologies.
Turning to imports, the interpretation of the GDP growth coefficient, which now refers to the exporting
20Regression tables are omitted to save space but are available upon request.
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country, is more difficult. In any case, as can be seen from Table 14, these coefficients are not significant in
both 2008S1-2009S1 and 2007S1–2008S1. We can nevertheless gauge the counterfactual impact of Belgian
GDP growth on imports. Using the GDP growth coefficient estimated for exports and using data on Belgian
GDP growth for the two periods, we find that 47.30% of the import drop can be attributed to a fall in demand
for tradable goods in Belgium. Hence, almost half of the fall in imports is due to the demand shock.
The coefficients of the two dummies for trade with non-EU countries in and outside of the OECD are
both positive, sizeable, and significant (in 3 of the 4 cases) in the crisis period. In stark contrast, the same
coefficients in the period before the collapse are negative and significant. This means that exports and
imports with non-EU countries grew less in 2007S1–2008S1 than with EU partners (the reference category).
This pattern was reversed in 2008S1–2009S1: trade with countries outside of the EU helped to mitigate the
trade collapse. However, given that trade with such countries represents only about 23% of Belgian exports
and 25% of imports, the positive effect has been largely offset by the collapse of trade with EU partners.
The fact that non-EU trade, especially imports, fell less than EU trade suggests indirectly that protectionist
measures played only a minor role in explaining the trade collapse.
As for fluctuations in exchange rates, the magnitude of the coefficients indicates that they have affected
exports more strongly during the trade collapse period as compared to 2007S1–2008S1. Still, the reverse holds
for import growth where exchange rates had no significant impact on 2008S1–2009S1 while being negative
and significant in the previous period. However, despite the size of the coefficients, the implied magnitudes
for changes in export values are small. Using the estimated model to evaluate the counterfactual situation in
which no exchange rate change would have occurred during 2008S1–2009S1, i.e. exch rate change=0, reveals
that fluctuations of the euro can be blamed for only a very little share (5.44%) of the total drop in Belgian
exports. The coefficient of exch rate change in the imports growth regression is not significant.
Product characteristics. The reference group for product dummies is consumer non-durables. Therefore,
the foregoing discussions and the magnitudes of the fall in demand apply solely to this category of goods.
However, in line with the margin decomposition provided in Section 3, product dummies for the categories
intermediates, capital goods, and consumer durables are all negative and strongly significant in the 2008S1–
2009S1 period, thereby indicating that these goods experienced a larger fall in trade. By contrast, in the
2007S1-2008S1 period these categories did not display a significantly higher or lower export or import growth
when compared to consumer non-durables.
What are the causes of such different behavior? The answer is likely to be a differential fall in demand.
To provide evidence of this we estimated the 2008S1–2009S1 export growth model separately for each of the
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broad product categories.21 Our estimates of the growth rate GDP coefficient are in line with the ultimate
conclusion of Baldwin (2009) that ‘postponable goods’ have been particularly hit by the negative demand shock
affecting tradable goods. More precisely, the coefficient when restricting the estimation to intermediates goods
(0.0254) is higher than that when restricting estimations to consumer non-durables (0.0234). Even higher
coefficients (0.0284 and 0.0412) are obtained in capital goods and consumer durables regressions, respectively.
Evaluating a counterfactual scenario in which the fall in trade would have been the same across product
categories and equal to the one of the reference group ‘consumer non-durables’, i.e. setting product dummies
coefficients equals to zero in the 2008S1–2009S1 export and import growth equations, delivers the following
results: 22.36% of the export collapse is due to a more severe shock affecting postponable goods, the equivalent
figure for imports being 27.15%. Finally, the coefficients of the Rauch (1999) measure of product differentiation
(fraclib diff ) before and into the trade collapse suggest that more differentiated goods experienced a smaller
fall in trade, though the implied magnitude is rather small.
Summary of findings. In the case of exports, our results point to a generalized fall in demand in tradables,
especially consumer durables and capital goods. Evidence for this is provided by an unusually large GDP
growth coefficient, sizeable product dummies, and widely different GDP growth coefficients in regressions for
separate product categories. Restricted access to finance seems to play a role in the fall in exports, albeit of
a smaller magnitude. We find no strong evidence for the disruption of global value chains or for inventory
adjustment. In the case of imports, a fall in Belgian demand seems to be the main explanation. We find some
limited role for involvement in global value chains (about 6 percentage points out of the 27 percentage point
fall in imports), but again little role for trade finance and no role for inventory adjustments.
5 Trade crisis or trade collapse?
So far, we have uncovered strong evidence that a fall in tradeable goods demand (particularly strong for
‘postponable goods’) has been the major cause of the trade collapse. There is also some evidence that
financial constraints contributed to that fall, though to a lesser extent. Observe that these findings do not per
se imply that there has been a trade crisis, i.e., a situation in which international trade suffered more than
domestic trade. To investigate this question, we now examine changes in exports-to-turnover and imports-
to-intermediates ratios at the firm level.22 If international trade per se is in a crisis, both ratios should have
21Regression tables are omitted to save space but are available upon request.
22Observe that exports-to-turnover ratios are monotonically related to exports-to-domestic-sales ratios. We thus use the former
in what follows since we have no information on domestic sales.
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fallen during the period we consider.
As shown earlier by Table 2 and Figure 2, there is no systematic fall in exports-to-production and imports-
to-production ratios, both in the whole economy and across broad product categories. In fact, those ratios
even increased in some product categories, thus implying that domestic production contracted in some cases
more than trade. This descriptive evidence already casts some doubts on the existence of a ‘trade crisis’ in
Belgium. Nevertheless, there might still be compositional effects across firms and industries, and those can
provide valuable information on the channel(s) through which the fall in demand affected Belgian exports
and imports. We therefore now revisit this issue using a more detailed micro-econometric analysis of the
export-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios.
In what follows we exploit data on firm turnover and intermediates purchases for 2008S1 and 2009S1.23
The data comes from monthly and quarterly VAT declarations.24 We construct the log of the firm-level ratio







where Turn2008i denotes firm i’s turnover and X
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where Inte2008i denotes firm i’s total purchases of intermediates and I
2008
i represents imports aggregated at
the firm-level. For 2009, φ2009i,X and φ
2009
i,I are defined in the same way using 2009 first-semester data. The
sample of firms covered by the analysis is given by those stayers for which both information on balance sheets
and VAT declarations are available, i.e 8,360 firms among the 12,964 export stayers and 14,388 firms among
the 23,782 import stayers. VAT declarations are virtually exhaustive so that the binding data constraint is
the availability of balance sheet information. The data cover 73.07% (73.61%) of 2008S1 (2009S1) exports
and 71.33% (70.20%) of 2008S1 (2009S1) imports by stayers. As explained before, most firms that have to be
dropped are Belgian affiliates belonging to foreign groups that are considered as residents by Belgian customs
23Ideally we would like to examine whether firms’ exports and imports fall by more than the value of their production (as
opposed to turnover and purchased intermediates, which potentially include re-exporting or other commercial activities). At the
time of writing, however, the required firm-level production data is not available. Even when that data becomes available it will
only cover the sample of large firms used by the Belgian National Institute of Statistics to provide aggregate production figures
(Prodcom survey). We therefore examine ratios of exports to turnover and imports to intermediates purchases to maximize the
number of firms we can include in our analysis.
24The frequency at which declarations have to be filed depends on the firm’s size. See Appendix A.
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but do not exist as a separate legal entity. It is likely that a substantial part of the trade done by these firms
involves re-exporting and, in that respect, their exclusion from the analysis is more of an asset than a liability.
In addition, some small firms do not submit balance sheets and have to be dropped.
Let us first highlight a few descriptives about the constructed ratios. The difference φ2009i,X − φ2008i,X has a
mean of −0.0290 and a median of −0.0183: the average exports-to-turnover ratio decreased by 2.9%, while




i , not in log
)
in 2008 was 35.52%, meaning that the 2.9% fall translates into a meagre 1 percentage point reduction (2.9%×
0.3552 = 0.0103). We can hence already conclude that its decrease has, on average, been negligible — the
ratio of exports-to-turnover at the firm level has not been affected by the trade collapse. Observe furthermore
that the correlation between φ2009i,X and φ
2008
i,X equals 0.84 for our 8,360 observations, thus suggesting that firm
patterns have been very stable during the trade collapse. Results for imports-to-intermediates ratios convey
the same message. The mean of φ2009i,I − φ2008i,I equals −0.0296, while the median equals −0.0124. The average
imports-to-intermediates ratio decreased by 2.96% while the median ratio fell by 1.24%, starting from an
average level of 26.16%. Thus, changes in that ratio were negligible too. Last, the correlation between φ2009i,I
and φ2008i,I is 0.79 for our 14,388 observations.
We regress both φ2009i,X − φ2008i,X and φ2009i,I − φ2008i,I on the same set of firm-level characteristics used in the
previous section and listed in Table 13. We use OLS and provide robust standard errors. To take into account
the fact that some covariates would also affect exports-to-production and imports-to-production ratios in a
‘normal period’, we also report estimations of the same model for 2007–2008. Both sets of results are reported
in Table 16. As an additional robustness check, we also ran the same regressions with either no NACE
dummies or with firm variables in continuous form. The results are qualitatively identical and the tables are
reported in Appendix D.
Insert Table 16 about here.
As can be seen from the left panel of Table 16, most firm-level characteristics are not significant in
explaining changes in either exports-to-turnover or imports-to-intermediates ratios for the trade collapse
period. In some cases, a significant coefficient in 2008S1–2009S1 corresponds to a coefficient of the same
magnitude in 2007S1–2008S1 (for example, Dshare exp sales for exports, which is not statistically different
across the two periods). This holds despite the fact that, as shown in the previous section and in Table 15,
there is no major problem of collinearity among regressors. Inspection of standard errors reveals that financial
variables are not significantly different from each other in the two periods. We may thus conclude that the
negative effect of financial variables identified in the analysis of the previous section has affected foreign trade
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and domestic activities equally. In other words, the credit crunch has not disproportionately hurt the activity
of trading across national borders per se.
There are some effects for firm size and productivity, as well as for some variables capturing the degree
of involvement in international trade and value-added chains. However, the signs are sometimes opposite to
what one would expect from a ‘trade crisis story’. For example, the positive and significant coefficient of
foreign-owned firms (for) in the imports-to-intermediates analysis suggests that foreign-owned firms (which
are more likely to be part of global production networks) saw their imports-to-intermediates ratios fall less
than domestically owned firms. In any case, the implied magnitudes are small. The strongest piece of evidence
that we find is that firms which were more involved in global value chains in 2007 (Dvalue add chain) saw their
exports and imports fall by more than their turnover or intermediates purchases. Though not significant,
the 2007–2008 export coefficient of Dvalue add chain is half of the magnitude of the one in 2008-2009, thus
suggesting that some of these firm variables capture mean-reversion effects. This is, for example, very clear
for Dshare exp sales in the exports-to-turnover analysis. However, even when considering the full magnitude
of the coefficient, a firm with an export-to-turnover ratio of 0.4999 (which is the mean value for firms with
Dvalue add chain = 1 in 2008) would see its ratio in 2009 decrease to 49.99%−10.06%×0.4999 = 0.4496 had the
trade collapse affected such a firm in the same way as those with Dvalue add chain = 0. This is hardly strong
evidence that firms highly involved in global value-added chains have been hit by a major crisis specific to
international trade.
As for the (unreported but available upon request) NACE dummies, they are generally insignificant, the
reference industry being ‘Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers’. Only 2 of the 44 (2× 22)
manufacturing industry dummies has a significant coefficient at the 5% confidence level in the 2008S1–2009S1
exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates regressions. Furthermore, there is no significant evidence
that the distribution industry has been affected differently.
The fact that almost all coefficients in the exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates regressions are
insignificant and that, even when they are significant, their magnitude is small, leads us logically to conclude
that it is not a trade crisis — just a trade collapse caused by a strong decrease in the demand for tradables
that has equally affected domestic and foreign operations.
6 What have we learned?
Using detailed trade and balance sheet data, we provide a micro-econometric analysis of the fall in Belgian
imports and exports before and during the 2008–2009 trade collapse. A few clear results emerge from our
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analysis. First, the overwhelming part of the trade collapse occurred at the intensive margin and is due to a
fall in average quantities and unit prices. Entry into foreign markets showed remarkable stability. Interestingly
there was no massive exit, hinting at the existence of large sunk costs of entering foreign markets (Roberts and
Tybout, 1997): large sunk entry costs create an option value of remaining an exporter or an importer during
the crisis. In addition, exporters’ resilience suggests that trade will bounce back quickly as the macroeconomic
environment returns to normal: in fact Belgian trade recovered its pre-collapse monthly level as early as in
April 2010. These results concur with previous analyses of trade during the Asian crisis (Bernard et al., 2009),
but are nonetheless remarkable given the magnitude of this trade collapse.
Second, we find overall only little support for supply-side based explanations of the trade collapse. On the
one hand, GDP growth of the destination countries is the single most important determinant of exports in our
econometric analysis, explaining up to 57% of the fall in exports and 47% of the fall in imports. This applies
particularly to the demand for durable goods and capital goods: trade in these categories fell systematically
more, with a greater elasticity to GDP. While studies using more aggregated data (Baldwin, 2009) or calibrated
simulations (Eaton et al., 2010) reach qualitatively and quantitatively similar conclusions, we are not aware
of any other firm-level analysis confirming these results to date. On the other hand, few firm- or product-level
characteristics are systematically related to the fall in trade, especially when compared with the fall in domestic
operations. For instance, access to credit (as proxied by financial balance sheet variables) can explain about
30% of the fall in exports, but has no explanatory power regarding exports-to-turnover ratios. In other words,
financial constraints affected foreign and domestic operations equally. Similarly involvement in global value
chains, as measured by the share of imported intermediates or export intensity, explains quantitatively some
of the collapse of imports, but has little explanatory power on imports-to intermediate ratios. More generally
exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios did not show any strong systematic correlation with
other firm characteristics, nor did they follow any general downward trend. If there was a recent increase in
trade frictions due to protectionism, it had no sizable effect on Belgian trade.
Of course, more research is needed to investigate the causes of the disproportionate fall in the demand
for tradable goods. Candidate explanations involve deferred consumption of durables due to precautionary
motives, substitution patterns among consumers with non-homothetic preferences, or a bias towards non-
tradables in fiscal stimuli packages. Such investigations, while fundamental to our understanding of the crisis,
are beyond the scope of the present paper.
Third, some of our findings raise other questions for future research. For instance, sales of entrants and
exiters in 2009S1 are dramatically lower than those of the previous cohorts in 2008S1, while the same is not
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true of stayers. This fact is at odds with the Melitz (2003) model and would deserve further investigation in
relation to recent dynamic export models. The large increase in the number of importers despite the large
fall in imports would also be worthy of investigation.
Last, let us point out two caveats of our analysis. As we acknowledged, one dimension of the extensive
margin that we cannot control for is the number of trading partners a firm has for each product-market
combination. Our prediction that trade will bounce back quickly is conditional on the hypothesis that this
margin has not been strongly affected by the current trade collapse. Also, we do not know to what extent
our results generalize to other countries. Developing countries might be much more severely affected by the
credit crunch and the drying up of trade credit (Berman and Martin, 2009). This would cause a higher trade
fall at the extensive margin there, and make a quick recovery less likely. Furthermore, implicit trade barriers
might have risen more in some pairs of countries than in others (Jacks et al., 2009; Eaton et al., 2010). More
research involving micro-data from other countries is thus certainly called for in the future.
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Balance sheet data and firm-level variables. Firm-level variables are constructed from 2006 and 2007
balance sheet data from the Business Registry covering the population of firms required to file their (unconsol-
idated) accounts to the National Bank of Belgium (nbb). The data combine annual accounts with data from
the Crossroads Bank on firms’ main sector, activity and legal status. Overall, most firms that are registered
in Belgium (i.e., that exist as a separate legal entity) and have limited liability are required to file annual
accounts.25 Specifically, all limited-liability firms that are incorporated in Belgium have to report uncon-
solidated accounts involving balance sheet items and income statements. Belgian firms that are in addition
part of a group also have to submit consolidated accounts where they report the joint group’s activities in a
consolidated way. However, Belgian affiliates of a foreign group which do not exist as a separate legal entity in
Belgium are not required to report unconsolidated accounts (they are required to file a consolidated account,
but these data do not allow us to obtain firm-level characteristics for the Belgian affiliate). There are two
types of annual accounts: full and abbreviated. Firms have to file a full annual account when they exceed at
least two of the three following cutoffs: (i) employ at least 50 employees; (ii) have an annual turnover of more
than 7.3 million euros; and (iii) report total assets of more than 3.65 million euros.
For the 2008S1-2009S1 (2007S1-2008S1) analysis, we selected those companies that either filed a full or an
abbreviated balance sheet in 2007 (2006) while reporting at least one employee. Annualized balance sheets
provide us with information on the (full-time equivalent) number of employees, operating profits, equity and
liability values, the amount of liabilities due after or within one year, the amount of liabilities held by financial
institutions or commercial parties, the values of intermediate stocks, and the NACE rev1.1 5-digit code of the
firm. Data on firm turnover, value added, purchased intermediates, and investments in 2006 and 2007 come
from mandatory VAT declarations provided by the nbb. Balance sheets also record information on these
four variables, but we prefer to use VAT declarations as information is more accurate and virtually covers the
universe of Belgian firms. Multinational status and foreign ownership of a firm come from the yearly Survey of
Foreign Direct Investments carried out by the nbb. Finally, firm-level imports and exports, which are needed
to construct some firm-level controls, refer to the same year of the balance sheet information. Data have been
25Exceptions include: sole traders; small companies whose members have unlimited liability; general partnerships; ordinary
limited partnerships; cooperative limited liability companies; large companies whose members have unlimited liability, if none of
the members is a legal entity; public utilities; agricultural partnerships; hospitals, unless they have taken the form of a trading
company with limited liability; health insurance funds; professional associations; schools and higher education institutions.
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obtained by aggregating firm-product-country level transaction values in the trade database over the entire
year at the firm level.
Trade and production data. Import and export data by firm, product, and country for Belgium is
collected by the nbb on a monthly basis. More precisely, the information comes from intra-EU (Intrastat)
and extra-EU (Extrastat) trade declarations that cover the universe of trade transactions.26 Firm and trade
data were merged using the VAT number which identifies each firm in Belgium. The data is extremely rich and
comparable in quality to the widely known French Customs data used by, e.g., Eaton et al. (2004). Imports
and exports of each firm are recorded in current euros at the 8-digit CN level27 by country of origin/destination.
Information on either the number of units or the weight in kilograms (or sometimes both) of traded goods is
available and is product specific. Weight is the most widely used quantity unit.
In order to construct the quantity index used in Tables 4 to 10 we have use a ‘mixed quantity’ unit
corresponding to kilograms, whenever recorded, and to units for those products recorded in units only. We
then compute the average mixed quantity value across all firm-country-product transactions involved in the
group considered (example: exports of small firms) separately for 2008 and 2009. We define the average price
as the ratio of the average value of trade transactions across all firm-country-products involved in the group
considered and the average mixed quantity defined above. As long as the composition of trade is stable across
goods recorded in kilograms and in units, our indicators are informative about average changes in prices and
quantities traded. To check robustness, we have also computed a quantity and a price index following the
same methodology described above while considering only trade registered in kilograms. Results are very
similar in terms of price and quantity changes between 2008S1 and 2009S1.
Finally, monthly production data by Prodcom-2008 2-digit codes are provided by the Belgian National
Institute of Statistics. Data are based on mandatory declarations by a sample of about 8,000 firms representing
the largest manufacturing producers in Belgium. Once anonymized, data are then made available for different
levels of aggregation under the Prodcom database brand. Some goods, especially those referring to agriculture
and fishery, are not included in the data.
Country and product data. Exchange rate variations between 2008S1 and 2009S1 (as well as between
2007S1 and 2008S1) refer to the change in the nominal interbank exchange rates with respect to the euro
26For intra-EU trade, the thresholds above which a legal obligation to declare arises are relatively small. In addition firms often
provide information about their trade even when they are below the thresholds. For Extra-EU trade data are exhaustive for trade
flows over 1,000 euros or 1,000 kilograms.
27The 8-digit Combined Nomenclature (CN) is the main product classification in the European Community. It is an product-
based classification that draws extensively on the Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature.
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at noon on April 1st, as recorded by the Bank of Canada. We choose April 1st as our midpoint in the
first semester of each year (April 2nd in 2007). The average growth rate of GDP between 2008 and 2009 is
the average of the two annual growth rates of the GDP at constant prices and comes from the IMF World
Economic Outlook database as of October 2009. A mirror definition applies to the average growth rate between
2007 and 2008. The product classification follows the EU’s ‘Main Industrial Groupings’ in official statistics,
as described in the European Commission Regulation No 586/2001 (March 26, 2001). This classification
separates products into intermediate, capital, consumer durable, consumer non-durable, and energy products.
Some HS4 products (mainly agricultural goods) cannot be assigned to one of these categories using the
correspondence table provided by the EU; we thus classify them as ‘Residual goods’. The product group
‘Intermediate, Capital, & Durables’ used in the paper refers to the grouping of intermediate, capital goods,
and consumer durables. All remaining product categories are subsumed by the ‘Other Goods’ group. The
measure of product differentiation we use is based on the Rauch (1999) classification and corresponds to the
share of HS6 codes within an HS4 category that are neither sold on an organized exchange nor referenced
priced. We use the ‘liberal’ classification.
B Additional margin decompositions of the trade collapse
To gauge whether the trade collapse visible in Tables 4 and 5 roughly affects all firms, sectors, and trading
partners equally, we split our sample more finely along various dimensions. In particular, we address the
following four questions:
(i) Is there a geographic pattern in the trade collapse and its different margins, i.e., are Belgian trade
margins behaving differently across ‘regions’?
(ii) Are large or small, and more or less productive, firms affected differently?
(iii) Does a firm’s ownership status (foreign versus domestically owned) and its multinational status matter?
(iv) Does a firm’s debt structure in terms of overall leverage or financial versus commercial debt matter?
A detailed decomposition of changes in exports and imports at the different margins along these dimensions
can provide some first insights into the key explanations of the sharp fall in trade during the 2008S1–2009S1
trade collapse. In particular, item (i) provides information about geographic shifts in trade flows, while items
(iii)–(v) provide information about reallocation of market shares across firms, the collapse of global value
chains, and the importance of access to credit.
In what follows, we present results for exports and imports separately.28 Table 7 decomposes the margins
28We present only the most significant results and briefly comment on others. The full set of results is available as a spreadsheet
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of Belgian exports to EU member states, to OECD non-EU countries, and to non-OECD non-EU countries,
respectively. As can be seen, total export changes are very similar across the three country groups. The single
most important insight is, as in Tables 4 and 5, the overwhelming contribution of the intensive margin to the
trade collapse. There is not much change in terms of entry or exit and in terms of the average number of
partner countries. Furthermore, while there is some mild evidence of product adding for exports to non-EU
countries, the overall impact on exports is rather limited. In all three cases, the fall in the intensive margin
amounts to about 25–30% meaning that the small differences in the total export decrease across regions is
due to the extensive margin.29
Insert Table 7 about here.
Recall that the change in the extensive margin for total Belgian exports in Table 4 amounts to about
2.68% of the total trade fall. As shown by Table 7, this aggregate figure masks some regional variation.
Indeed, the extensive margin falls and contributes more (5.62%) for exports to EU member states, whereas
it increases for exports to OECD non-EU countries and for exports to non-OECD non-EU countries thereby
reducing the trade fall by 11.43% and 0.2% respectively. Bearing in mind that such figures are small, cross-
regional differences in the response of the extensive margin might be explained by the fact that arm’s length
transactions are relatively more common in the EU. Indeed Bernard et al. (2009) show, using US data, that
the extensive margin reacts more strongly to negative shocks for arm’s length than for related-party trade.
Results for imports closely mirror those for exports and are therefore not reported in detail. Imports
from EU member states dropped by 28.88%, whereas imports from OECD non-EU countries and for imports
from non-OECD non-EU countries dropped by 24.24% and by 24.71%, respectively. The contribution of the
intensive margin remains extremely high in all cases, with 90.68%, 131.05% and 131.31%, respectively. The
overall positive contribution of the extensive margin of 1.79% given by Table 5 is due to a positive contribution
of 9.31% to the drop of imports from EU member states and a negative contribution (i.e. an increase in the
extensive margin counterbalancing the fall) of -31.05% for imports from OECD non-EU countries and -31.31%
for imports from non-OECD non-EU countries.
Insert Table 8 about here.
from the authors upon request.
29In an unreported robustness check (available upon request) we also provide an alternative price-quantity decomposition where
we only focus on goods which are reported by weight. Results slightly differ from those reported in the paper. The reasons are
that: (i) the total trade of goods that are measured in kilograms has decreased less than the trade of goods measures in units;
and (ii) Belgium trades proportionally more goods measured in kilograms with non-EU countries.
30
Table 8 summarizes the changes in export and import margins for small and for large firms. We define
size in terms of employment and small firms as those being below the 2-digit NACE rev1.1 industry median
size across all trading firms.30 Large firms are defined analogously. As can be seen from the top part of
Table 8, larger firms see their exports fall relatively more on average, although the differences are modest.31
The gap is wider in the case of imports: imports of small firms decrease by 12.80%, while imports of large
firms decrease by 30.46%. Again, the fall of both exports and imports occurs primarily at the intensive
margin. We also decomposed the margins between low and high productivity firms (defined again as firms
below or above the industry median across trading firm) with productivity being measured as value added
per worker. Results are fairly similar. Low productivity firms saw their exports and imports fall by −16.51%
and −17.87%, respectively, whereas the corresponding figures for high productivity firms are −28.56% and
−31.29%. It is important to stress that these findings challenge the view that larger and more productive
firms are better equipped to overcome adverse market shocks. To the extent that market participation and
trade volumes are proxies for ‘success’ during a crisis, our results suggests that small and less productive firms
are relative ‘winners’.
Insert Table 9 about here.
Table 9 decomposes the margins of changes in imports across multinational and non-multinational, as well
as across foreign owned versus non-foreign owned firms.32 The difference between the various types of firms
occurs essentially at the intensive margin: firms with international ownership structures (multinationals and
foreign-owned firms) reduced their import values substantially more, both along the quantity and the price
margins. Note that changes in the latter margin could be explained by either the composition of multinational
trade, or by changes in how multinationals record related-party transactions (transfer pricing). We have no
information on the latter aspect. Results for exports look very similar and are not reported here.
Insert Table 10 about here.
Finally, Table 10 shows that there are no substantial differences in the changes at the various margins
for Belgian exporters according to the size and structure of their debt. Although firms with larger debt-to-
liabilities ratios or with a larger share of financial (as opposed to commercial) debts experienced slightly larger
30Some exporters and importers are lost because of the lack of balance sheet data which is required for figures on employment
and other firm characteristics. The same issue applies to Tables 9 and 10. See Appendix A for further details.
31Those results are consistent with those of Bricongne et al. (2009) for French firms.
32A multinational firm is a firm that is registered in Belgium and which owns, either directly or indirectly, more than 10% of
the equity of at least one firm registered in another country. A foreign-owned firm is a firm that is registered in Belgium and the
equity of which is, either directly or indirectly, owned (partially or in total) by one or more firms registered in another country,
with each owing at least 10% of the equity of the Belgian firm.
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declines in exports (essentially because of slightly more exit in this case), they seem to be affected in roughly
similar ways. Results using the share of long-term debt in firms’ overall debt (not reported here) yield a
similar picture. We also decomposed the import margins along the debt dimension, with very similar results.
For example, low debt-to-liabilities importers contracted on average by 28.43% (against 24.53% for exporters),
while high debt-to-liabilities importers contracted on average by 29.89% (against 29.72% for exporters). The
decomposition of margins, while not identical, remains qualitatively very similar.
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C Baseline Tables and Figures
Table 1: Percentage changes in exports and imports by broad product category (2008S1-2009S1).
Product category Change in Exports (%) Change in Imports (%)
Consumer non-durables -8.48 -4.95
Intermediates -30.39 -30.94
Capital goods -23.25 -23.62
Consumer durables -38.03 -39.17
Energy -43.50 -44.18
Residual -24.04 -16.23
Notes: See Appendix A for further details on product categories.
Table 2: % changes in exports, imports, export/production, and import/production ratios by product (2008S1-2009S1).
Prodcom-2008 product name % Export Exp./Prod. Exp./Prod. % Imp. Imp./Prod. Imp./Prod.
change ratio 2008S1 ratio 2009S1 change ratio 2008S1 ratio 2009S1
Other mining and quarrying -48.20 10.16 6.39 -49.23 10.91 6.73
Mfg of food products -3.61 0.80 0.81 -6.67 0.59 0.58
Mfg of beverages -21.41 0.71 0.56 -25.78 0.70 0.52
Mfg of tobacco products -11.78 0.84 0.80 -1.17 0.76 0.82
Mfg of textiles -26.39 1.01 1.04 -22.09 0.48 0.52
Mfg of wearing apparel -20.10 16.53 17.50 -7.79 24.37 29.77
Mfg of leather and related products -19.82 11.39 12.13 -9.91 15.57 18.62
Mfg of wood, products of wood -31.15 0.72 0.66 -24.76 0.64 0.65
Mfg of paper and paper products -17.89 0.87 0.84 -14.60 0.86 0.87
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 74.70 0.05 0.10 50.75 0.05 0.09
Mfg of chemicals and chemical products -30.18 0.97 1.03 -34.49 0.72 0.72
Mfg of basic pharmaceutical products 2.43 1.21 1.22 26.95 0.73 0.91
Mfg of rubber and plastic products -22.39 1.27 1.21 -20.91 1.10 1.06
Mfg of other non-metallic mineral products -25.24 0.60 0.54 -22.17 0.41 0.39
Mfg of basic metals -46.44 0.89 0.92 -45.65 0.58 0.62
Mfg of fabric. metal products, -20.91 0.52 0.52 -23.65 0.58 0.57
Mfg of computer, electronic and optical products -17.93 3.38 3.74 -13.29 4.97 5.82
Mfg of electrical equipment -18.46 1.08 1.11 -17.15 1.31 1.36
Mfg of machinery and equipment n. e. c. -27.27 1.52 1.52 -30.18 1.65 1.57
Mfg of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers -32.59 1.08 1.12 -27.09 1.27 1.43
Mfg of other transport equipment 15.21 1.05 1.36 -10.09 1.21 1.22
Mfg of furniture -18.85 0.73 0.67 -15.49 1.13 1.07
Other manufacturing -3.75 9.25 10.14 -9.23 9.58 9.90
Repair and installation of machinery -22.20 0.03 0.03 -3.19 0.07 0.07
Total -25.15 0.96 0.95 -24.08 1.04 1.02
Notes: See Appendix A for further details. The figures for changes in total exports and imports slightly differ from those provided
in the text because the data in the table do not include some product categories, such as agricultural goods, that do not belong to
the Prodcom classification.
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Table 3: % changes in exports plus imports by country for the top-100 Belgian trading partners.
Country Rank % Trade change Country Rank % Trade change Country Rank % Trade change
NL 1 -31.83 AU 35 8.48 CY 69 -35.05
DE 2 -25.16 SA 36 -8.51 EC 70 15.35
FR 3 -25.31 RO 37 -28.39 LV 71 -42.00
GB 4 -27.47 EG 38 -53.49 PE 72 -37.83
IT 5 -26.87 TH 39 -16.16 BY 73 -18.36
US 6 -24.95 QA 40 35.67 LB 74 -1.65
ES 7 -25.68 MX 41 -11.40 CM 75 -4.22
LU 8 -31.10 ID 42 -12.77 GH 76 -18.40
SE 9 -41.33 MA 43 -31.07 CI 77 -2.92
IN 10 -32.49 TW 44 -14.58 SN 78 -49.34
CN 11 0.17 DZ 45 -1.61 SY 79 -16.80
JP 12 -23.78 UA 46 -37.26 SR 80 29.04
RU 13 -48.98 CD 47 -44.41 LY 81 14.89
PL 14 -23.40 VN 48 -31.80 DO 82 -50.12
NO 15 -39.12 AR 49 -36.59 JO 83 19.55
CH 16 -17.45 SG 50 -17.06 LS 84 -20.78
IL 17 -58.66 MY 51 -20.06 KW 85 21.52
TR 18 -33.78 SI 52 -21.13 LK 86 -22.96
CZ 19 -20.87 TN 53 -14.73 IS 87 -26.81
AT 20 -22.34 LT 54 -16.11 NC 88 -23.43
AE 21 -40.51 VE 55 -44.57 KE 89 -16.37
DK 22 -25.31 MH 56 -99.99 ZM 90 -28.98
KR 23 -36.82 IR 57 -22.45 CG 91 -24.93
BR 24 -34.73 PH 58 -31.52 GN 92 -6.82
IE 25 21.50 NZ 59 -2.26 MT 93 -22.05
FI 26 -25.84 NG 60 -32.34 SL 94 -39.26
PT 27 -25.03 AO 61 12.90 MR 95 -66.38
HK 28 -9.84 CL 62 36.79 HN 96 -22.24
CA 29 -21.86 PK 63 -8.21 BF 97 22.24
HU 30 -25.83 CO 64 12.48 KZ 98 -10.38
ZA 31 -25.33 BD 65 8.31 MK 99 -57.05
GR 32 -31.16 EE 66 -32.95 BJ 100 -21.04
BG 33 -46.43 HR 67 -37.08
SK 34 -23.24 CR 68 -9.35
Notes: Country codes are ginve in the ISO2 format. Countries are ranked according to their total trade with
Belgium in the first semester of 2008.
Table 4: Changes in the margins of Belgian exports (2008S1–2009S1).
Total exports (all firm-country-product combinations)
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 101.25 18,053 6.62 5.58 151,844 115,277 1.32
2009 S1 74.69 18,227 6.49 5.59 112,925 92,221 1.22
(∆− 1)% -26.23 0.96 -1.92 0.16 -25.63 -20.00 -7.04
Margin’s contribution 2.68% 97.32%
Notes: Total exports are given in billion euros while average sales are given in euros. See Appendix A
for further details.
Table 5: Changes in the margins of Belgian imports (2008S1–2009S1).
Total imports (all firm-country-product combinations)
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 106.10 31,497 3.88 7.02 123,681 118,747 1.04
2009 S1 76.64 33,576 3.74 6.78 89,855 98,089 0.92
(∆− 1)% -27.77 6.60 -3.54 -3.32 -27.35 -17.40 -12.05
Margin’s contribution 1.79% 98.21%
Notes: Total imports are given in billion euros while average sales are given in euros. See Appendix A
for further details.
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Table 6: Changes in the margins of Belgian trade in ‘Intermediate, Capital, & Durables’ vs ‘Other goods’ (2008S1–
2009S1).
Exports of goods classified as ‘Other goods’
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 34.98 8,925 4.40 5.80 153,589 108,005 1.42
2009 S1 27.63 9,022 4.34 5.77 122,267 95,809 1.28
(∆− 1)% -21.03 1.09 -1.35 -0.52 -20.39 -11.29 -10.26
Margin’s contribution 3.39% 96.61%
Exports of goods classified as ‘Intermediate, Capital, & Durables’
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 66.27 14,439 5.56 5.47 150,938 119,049 1.27
2009 S1 47.06 14,630 5.41 5.50 108,076 90,359 1.20
(∆− 1)% -28.98 1.32 -2.60 0.50 -28.40 -24.10 -5.66
Margin’s contribution 2.40% 97.60%
Imports of goods classified as ‘Other goods’
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 41.94 20,464 2.08 7.69 128,461 148,381 0.87
2009 S1 31.19 21,777 2.03 7.38 95,314 132,022 0.72
(∆− 1)% -25.64 6.42 -1.94 -3.96 -25.80 -11.02 -16.61
Margin’s contribution -0.77% 100.77%
Imports of goods classified as ‘Intermediate, Capital, & Durables’
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 64.16 24,810 3.22 6.66 120,743 100,538 1.20
2009 S1 45.45 26,141 3.11 6.46 86,457 76,965 1.12
(∆− 1)% -29.17 5.36 -3.18 -3.03 -28.40 -23.45 -6.46
Margin’s contribution 3.14% 96.86%
Notes: Total exports (imports) are given in billion euros while average sales are given in euros. See
Appendix A for further details.
Table 7: Changes in the margins of Belgian exports across ‘regions’ (2008S1–2009S1).
Exports to EU member states only
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 77.90 7,544 7.70 8.16 164,348 139,639 1.18
2009 S1 57.60 7,652 7.46 8.16 123,602 112,781 1.10
(∆− 1)% -26.06 1.43 -3.07 0.00 -24.79 -19.23 -6.88
Margin’s contribution 5.62% 94.38%
Exports to OECD non-EU countries
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 9.55 8,457 2.17 3.59 145,205 76,032 1.91
2009 S1 6.90 8,569 2.13 3.74 101,162 49,465 2.05
(∆− 1)% -27.70 1.32 -1.68 4.18 -30.33 -34.94 7.09
Margin’s contribution -11.43% 111.43%
Exports to non-OECD non-EU countries
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 13.81 10,923 3.94 2.95 108,641 44,719 2.43
2009 S1 10.19 10,997 3.91 2.96 80,105 39,816 2.01
(∆− 1)% -26.22 0.68 -0.93 0.32 -26.27 -10.96 -17.19
Margin’s contribution -0.20% 100.20%
Notes: Total exports are given in billion euros while average sales are given in euros. See Appendix A
for further details.
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Table 8: Changes in the margins of Belgian trade for large and small firms (2008S1–2009S1).
Exports by small firms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 4.80 5,318 4.23 2.75 77,522 95,637 0.81
2009 S1 3.82 5,188 4.28 2.82 61,031 72,719 0.84
(∆− 1)% -20.52% -2.44% 1.14% 2.31% -21.27% -23.96% 3.54%
Margin’s contribution -4.13% 104.13%
Exports by large firms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 77.41 7,465 10.4352 6.21 159,929 128,679 1.24
2009 S1 56.24 7,519 10.1366 6.43 114,783 98,515 1.17
(∆− 1)% -27,35% 0.72% -2.86% 3.46% -28.23% -23.44% -6.25%
Margin’s contribution -3.82% 103.82%
Imports by small firms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 5.49 9,342 3.01 4.62 42,230 75,866 0.56
2009 S1 4.79 9,483 3.02 4.59 36,386 68,043 0.53
(∆− 1)% -12.80% 1.51% 0.30% -0.59% -13.84% -10.31% -3.93%
Margin’s contribution -8.76% 108.76%
Imports by large firms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008 S1 82.12 11,570 6.30 8.42 133,884 129,900 1.03
2009 S1 57.11 11,642 6.21 8.25 95,778 108,497 0.88
(∆− 1)% -30.46% 0.62% -1.40% -2.02% -28.46% -16.48% -14.35%
Margin’s contribution 7.79% 92.21%
Notes: Total exports (imports) are in billion euros while average sales are in euros. See Appendix
A for further details.
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Table 9: Changes in the margins of imports according to ownership structure (2008S1–2009S1).
Imports by non-multinational firms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 53.33 24,941 4.06 6.76 77,934 85,982 0.91
2009 S1 40.88 25,421 4.00 6.62 60,734 72,400 0.84
(∆− 1)% -23.34% 1.92% -1.40% -2.12% -22.07% -15.80% -7.45%
Margin’s contribution 6.17% 93.83%
Imports by multinational firms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 36.95 702 12.25 10.68 402,288 392,168 1.03
2009 S1 23.42 717 12.03 10.29 263,974 323,630 0.82
(∆− 1)% -36.61% 2.14% -1.84% -3.64% -34.38% -17.48% -20.49%
Margin’s contribution 7.58% 92.42%
Imports by non-foreign-owned firms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Period Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 35.71 24,297 3.97 6.51 56,815 70,084 0.81
2009S1 28.60 24,798 3.92 6.35 46,357 62,856 0,74
(∆− 1)% -19.91% 2.06% -1.45% -2.41% -18.41% -10.31% -9.03%
Margin’s contribution 8.35% 91.65%
Imports by foreign-owned firms
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Year Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 54.57 1,346 9.82 11.17 369,749 344,253 1.07
2009S1 35.70 1,340 9.83 10.99 246,448 266,920 0.92
(∆− 1)% -34.57% -0.45% 0.16% -1.55% -33.35% -22.46% -14.04%
Margin’s contribution 4.36% 95.64%
Notes: Total imports are in billion euros while average sales are in euros. See Appendix A for further
details.
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Table 10: Changes in the margins of exports according to debt structure (2008S1–2009S1).
Exports by firms with low share of debts over liabilities
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Year Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 45.16 7,651 7.57 5.52 141,146 116,985 1.21
2009S1 34.08 7,672 7.47 5.69 104,476 89,788 1.16
(∆− 1)% -24.53% 0.27% -1.36% 3.08% -25.98% -23.25% -3.56%
Margin’s contribution -6.91% 106.91%
Exports by firms with high share of debts over liabilities
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Year Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 38.76 7,507 6.50 5.02 158,246 134,593 1.18
2009S1 27.24 7,391 6.43 5.06 113,401 105,279 1.08
(∆− 1)% -29.72% -1.55% -1.06% 0.68% -28.34% -21.78% -8.39%
Margin’s contribution 5.52% 94.48%
Exports by firms with low share of financial debts
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Year Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 39.85 7,580 6.71 5.10 153,370 117,823 1.30
2009S1 30.18 7,527 6.67 5.22 115,226 91,939 1.25
(∆− 1)% -24.25% -0.70% -0.72% 2.27% -24.87% -21.97% -3.72%
Margin’s contribution -2.95% 102.95%
Exports by firms with high share of financial debts
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Year Total Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
2008S1 44.06 7,521 7.39 5.48 144,628 130,558 1.11
2009S1 31.12 7,467 7.29 5.59 102,356 100,255 1.02
(∆− 1)% -29.36% -0.72% -1.44% 2.01% -29.23% -23.21% -7.84%
Margin’s contribution 0.53% 99.47%
Notes: Total exports are in billion euros while average sales are in euros. See Appendix A for further
details.
Table 11: The dynamics of exports and imports.
2008S1–2009S1 trade dynamics
Exports Imports
Firm Type N of firms Trade share in N of firms Trade share in
2009S1 2008S1 2009S1 2008S1
Stayers 12,964 0.98 0.98 23,782 0.98 0.98
Entrants 5,263 0.02 0.00 9,794 0.02 0.00
Exiters 5,089 0.00 0.02 7,715 0.00 0.02
2007S1–2008S1 trade dynamics
Exports Imports
Firm Type N of firms Trade share in N of firms Trade share in
2008S1 2007S1 2008S1 2007S1
Stayers 12,481 0.92 0.92 21,209 0.92 0.98
Entrants 5,572 0.08 0.00 10,288 0.08 0.00
Exiters 4,662 0.00 0.08 4,543 0.00 0.02
Notes: See Appendix A for further details.
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Table 12: Changes in the margins of Belgian exports and imports across cohorts of stayers, entrants and exiters.
Exports of Stayers
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Cohort Total Firms Countries Products Sales
2008S1 99.53 12,964 8.58 5.74 155,837
2009S1 72.85 12,964 8.46 5.86 113,256
(∆− 1)% -26.81 0.00 -1.41 2.16 -27.32
Margin’s contribution -2.28% 102.28%
Imports of Stayers
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Cohort Total Firms Countries Products Sales
2008S1 104.40 23,782 4.66 7.42 126,907
2009S1 74.74 23,782 4.68 7.27 92,463
(∆− 1)% -28.41 0.00 0.33 -2.07 -27.14
Margin’s contribution 5.26% 94.74%
Exports of Entrants
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Cohort Total Firms Countries Products Sales
2008S1 8.28 5,572 1.77 3.23 259,363
2009S1 1.83 5,263 1.64 2.11 101,183
(∆− 1)% -77.83 -5.55 -7.67 -34.84 -60.99
Margin’s contribution 37.52% 62.48%
Imports of Entrants
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Cohort Total Firms Countries Products Sales
2008S1 8.08 10,288 1.61 3.61 134,753
2009S1 1.90 9,794 1.48 3.09 42,590
(∆− 1)% -76.49 -4.80 -8.45 -14.64 -68.39
Margin’s contribution 20.43% 79.57%
Exports of Exiters
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Cohort Total Firms Countries Products Sales
2008S1 7.58 4,662 1.65 2.90 339,290
2009S1 1.72 5,089 1.61 3.43 61,090
(∆− 1)% -77.36 9.16 -2.61 18.27 -81.99
Margin’s contribution -8.76% 108.76%
Imports of Exiters
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Cohort Total Firms Countries Products Sales
2008S1 1.73 4,543 1.57 3.36 72,023
2009S1 1.70 7,715 1.47 3.10 48,358
(∆− 1)% -1.35 69.82 -6.22 -7.74 -32.86
Margin’s contribution -2,832.58% 2,932.58%
Notes: Total exports (imports) are given in billion euros while average sales
are given in euros. (∆− 1)% refers to percentage difference between cohorts:
2009S1 stayers exported 26.81% less in 2009S1 than did 2008S1 stayers in
2008S1. See Appendix A for further details.
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Table 13: Firm, country, and product regressors.
Variable name Description
Firm characteristics (2007 values)
Dsize size (in term of employment) of the firm
Dprod value added over workers
Dinterm share share of intermediates over turnover
Dshare exp sales share of exports over turnover
Dshare imp interm share of imports over intermediates
Dvalue add chain (exports*imports)/turnover
Dext fin dep (investments-operating profits)/investments
Dshare debts o liab share of debts over total liabilities
Dshare debts due after one share of debts due after one year
Dshare fin debt share of financial debt.
Dshare stock share of stock over turnover
for foreign firm dummy
mne multinational dummy
ηs NACE rev1.1 2-digit dummies
Country characteristics
OECD NO EU dummy for country belonging to the OECD (in 2008) but not to the EU
NO OECD NO EU dummy for country neither belonging to the OECD nor to the EU
exch rate change % change in the nominal exchange rate with the euro between the
end of the first quarter of 2008 (2007) and the end of the first quarter of 2009 (2008)
growth rate GDP average annual growth rate of the country between 2008 (2007) and 2009 (2008)
Product characteristics
intermediates intermediate goods dummy
capital goods capital goods dummy
consumer durables durable consumer goods dummy
consumer non durables non-durable consumer goods dummy
energy energy related goods dummy
redidual goods not belonging to the previous categories
fraclib diff measure of product differentiation (based on Rauch, 1999)
Notes: All firm characteristics prefixed with a ‘D’ are dummy variables that take value one if the firm characteristic
is above the NACE rev 1.1 2-digit industry median across trading firms and zero otherwise. Data sources and the
definitions of variables are provided in Appendix A.
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Table 14: Exports and imports growth: firm, country, and product determinants.
2008S1–2009S1 2007S1–2008S1
Into the collapse Before the collapse
Coefficient Exports Imports Exports Imports




(0.023) (0.010) (0.018) (0.009)
Dprod 0.0007 -0.0034 0.0108 0.0391
a
(0.020) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009)
Dinterm share -0.0162 -0.0208
c 0.0032 0.0071
(0.023) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009)
Dshare exp sales -0.0326 -0.0380
b -0.0087 0.0191
(0.046) (0.019) (0.022) (0.012)
Dshare imp interm 0.0100 -0.0263
b -0.0511a -0.0280b
(0.023) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011)
Dvalue add chain 0.0160 -0.0505
b 0.0309 -0.0507a
(0.042) (0.023) (0.026) (0.014)
Dext fin dep -0.0149 -0.0291
a -0.0350 -0.0256b
(0.016) (0.010) (0.021) (0.012)
Dshare debts o liab -0.0345 -0.0121 -0.0168 -0.0055
(0.026) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010)
Dshare debts due after one 0.0560
a 0.0199 0.0104 0.0097
(0.019) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012)
Dshare fin debt -0.0459
b -0.0032 0.0209 0.0011
(0.023) (0.013) (0.021) (0.011)
Dshare stock 0.0338
c -0.0131 0.0104 0.0113
(0.020) (0.013) (0.021) (0.010)
for -0.0263 0.0116 0.0181 0.0029
(0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.013)
mne -0.0141 0.0005 0.0114 -0.0304
(0.030) (0.024) (0.027) (0.023)
Country characteristics
OECD NO EU 0.1229a 0.1853a -0.1561a -0.2988a
(0.043) (0.026) (0.028) (0.036)
NO OECD NO EU 0.0271 0.1599a -0.0742b -0.2255a
(0.038) (0.038) (0.032) (0.041)
exch rate change -0.4654a -0.0525 -0.2885a -0.2988a
(0.092) (0.062) (0.064) (0.079)
growth rate GDP 0.0253a 0.0063 0.0138a 0.0056
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Product characteristics
intermediates -0.0359c -0.0580a 0.0126 -0.0246c
(0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015)
capital goods -0.0801a -0.0610a -0.0055 -0.0393
(0.030) (0.016) (0.025) (0.031)
consumer durables -0.1306a -0.0873a -0.0171 -0.0305
(0.038) (0.020) (0.045) (0.022)
energy -0.0380 -0.0021 0.0944b -0.0409
(0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.065)
residual -0.0429 -0.0333b 0.0150 -0.0572b
(0.030) (0.014) (0.029) (0.025)
fraclib diff 0.0171 0.0242
b -0.0347b -0.0255b
(0.020) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012)
Constant -0.2459b -0.0960 -0.0679 -0.0655
(0.110) (0.094) (0.073) (0.089)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 204,598 255,035 196,029 251,079
R2 0.0091 0.0073 0.0044 0.0062
Notes: Multi-level clustered standard errors following Cameron et al. (2006) are
given in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
Table 15: Correlation matrix of firm-level variables in the 2008S1-2009S1 export growth regression.
Dsize 1
Dprod 0.00 1
Dinterm share -0.01 -0.02 1
Dshare exp sales 0.10 0.10 0.00 1
Dshare imp interm 0.08 0.10 -0.12 0.20 1
Dvalue add chain 0.37 0.17 0.07 0.44 0.32 1
Dext fin dep -0.03 -0.34 0.11 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 1
Dshare debts o liab -0.06 -0.10 0.15 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.13 1
Dshare debts due after one 0.00 -0.11 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.16 0.22 1
Dshare fin debt 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.26 0.52 1
Dshare stock -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 0.15 0.22 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.10 1
for 0.21 0.27 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.21 -0.16 -0.04 -0.20 -0.14 -0.13 1
mne 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.06 -0.03 0.19 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.43 1
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Table 16: Firm-level export/turnover and imports/intermediates ratio change.
2008S1–2009S1 2007S1–2008S1
Into the collapse Before the collapse
Coefficient Exports to Imports to Exports to Imports
Turnover Intermediates Turnover Intermediates
change change change change
Dsize -0.0084 -0.0357
c 0.0936a 0.0502a
(0.035) (0.021) (0.032) (0.019)
Dprod 0.0032 0.0401
b 0.0557c 0.0263
(0.033) (0.020) (0.030) (0.018)
Dinterm share 0.0293 -0.0127 0.0442 0.0583
a
(0.030) (0.019) (0.027) (0.017)
Dshare exp sales -0.1478
a 0.0541 -0.1290a -0.0116
(0.035) (0.037) (0.031) (0.030)
Dshare imp interm 0.0231 -0.1165
a 0.0012 -0.0187
(0.034) (0.019) (0.029) (0.016)
Dvalue add chain -0.1006
b -0.0744b -0.0561 0.0209
(0.042) (0.036) (0.036) (0.029)
Dext fin dep -0.0172 -0.0366
c -0.0826a 0.0089
(0.033) (0.020) (0.029) (0.017)
Dshare debts o liab -0.0072 -0.0053 0.0225 -0.0110
(0.031) (0.019) (0.028) (0.017)
Dshare debts due after one -0.0058 -0.0041 0.0513
c 0.0108
(0.032) (0.022) (0.030) (0.018)
Dshare fin debt -0.0389 0.0392
c -0.0260 -0.0031
(0.032) (0.022) (0.030) (0.019)
Dshare stock 0.0267 0.0166 0.0372 0.0106
(0.029) (0.018) (0.027) (0.017)
for -0.0113 0.0923b -0.0986b -0.0360
(0.045) (0.040) (0.047) (0.030)
mne -0.0242 -0.0082 0.0813c 0.0350
(0.050) (0.042) (0.044) (0.036)
Constant 0.1234 -0.1582 -0.1278 -0.1051
(0.114) (0.120) (0.101) (0.065)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,360 14,388 8,250 13,983
R2 0.0164 0.0115 0.0191 0.0078
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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Figure 1: Monthly exports and imports (million euros).
Figure 2: Monthly export- and import-to-production value ratios. Export and Imports refer only to those
goods for which data on production is available from the Prodcom dataset.
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D Robustness checks
In this Appendix, we present additional estimation results for the export and import growth analysis of
Section 4, as well as for the exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratio analysis of Section 5. We
present results for two robustness checks: (i) no NACE industry dummies; (ii) continuous firm-level variables.
For the latter set of results, all variables are analogous to those summarized in Table 13, except that the
variables starting with C are now measured in continuous form and no longer as a dummy with respect to
the NACE rev 1.1 two-digit sectoral median value of the characteristic among trading firms. To deal with
outliers, we trim the data at 1% by eliminating, for each continuous covariate, those observations lying above
(below) the 99.5 (0.5) percentile. We consider firm size and productivity in log.
Tables 17 and 18 summarize the results obtained without NACE dummies while Tables 19 and 20 show
estimations with continuous firm-level variables. Results are mostly qualitatively similar to those in the main
text.
One difference between estimation with binary and continuous firm-level variables pertains to the coef-
ficients of financial characteristics. These coefficients are significant in the former and insignificant in the
latter. This difference might be due to non-linear effects of financial covariates. Therefore our last robust-
ness check introduces quadratic terms for Cshare debts due after one and Cshare fin debt. Results (available upon
request) show significantly positive and negative coefficients for Cshare debts due after one and Cshare fin debt for
the period 2008S1–2009S1, with square terms being significant and of opposite sign. The same coefficients
are not significant for 2007S1–2008S1. We conclude that our findings in regressions with binary covariates are
confirmed, although firms with very short maturities or very high leverage somewhat behaved differently.
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Table 17: Exports and imports growth: firm, country, and product determinants, no NACE dummies.
2008S1–2009S1 2007S1–2008S1
Into the collapse Before the collapse
Coefficient Exports Imports Exports Imports




(0.022) (0.009) (0.016) (0.008)
Dprod -0.0023 -0.0016 0.0108 0.0371
a
(0.018) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008)
Dinterm share -0.0224 -0.0200
c 0.0018 0.0058
(0.021) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009)
Dshare exp sales -0.0282 -0.0506
a -0.0161 0.0237b
(0.037) (0.019) (0.021) (0.012)
Dshare imp interm 0.0017 -0.0269
b -0.0517a -0.0264b
(0.021) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010)
Dvalue add chain 0.0419 -0.0545
b 0.0322 -0.0483a
(0.037) (0.023) (0.023) (0.012)
Dext fin dep -0.0239 -0.0341
a -0.0354c -0.0247b
(0.017) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010)
Dshare debts o liab -0.0452
c -0.0195c -0.0193 -0.0040
(0.024) (0.011) (0.018) (0.009)
Dshare debts due after one 0.0505
b 0.0178 0.0122 0.0079
(0.020) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012)
Dshare fin debt -0.0401
c -0.0042 0.0212 0.0022
(0.022) (0.013) (0.020) (0.010)
Dshare stock 0.0296 -0.0148 0.0157 0.0148
c
(0.021) (0.012) (0.020) (0.009)
for -0.0333 0.0001 0.0149 0.0093
(0.031) (0.025) (0.023) (0.013)
mne -0.0101 -0.0049 0.0132 -0.0237
(0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.021)
Country characteristics
OECD NO EU 0.1055b 0.1793a -0.1646a -0.3027a
(0.043) (0.022) (0.027) (0.034)
NO OECD NO EU 0.0132 0.1582a -0.0799a -0.2401a
(0.036) (0.037) (0.031) (0.040)
exch rate change -0.4931a -0.0669 -0.2896a -0.3128a
(0.093) (0.056) (0.061) (0.074)
growth rate GDP 0.0251a 0.0064c 0.0136a 0.0068c
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Product characteristics
intermediates -0.0790a -0.0977a -0.0016 -0.0192c
(0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.012)
capital goods -0.1002a -0.1024a -0.0088 -0.0243
(0.028) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022)
consumer durables -0.1449a -0.0991a -0.0262 -0.0277
(0.035) (0.019) (0.036) (0.018)
energy -0.0636 -0.0251 0.0873b -0.0312
(0.042) (0.026) (0.040) (0.050)
residual -0.0545c -0.0468a 0.0188 -0.0522b
(0.030) (0.013) (0.026) (0.022)
fraclib diff 0.0054 0.0238
b -0.0503a -0.0355a
(0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011)
Constant -0.0776c -0.0630a -0.0243 0.0372c
(0.045) (0.022) (0.042) (0.023)
Observations 204,598 255,035 196,029 251,079
R2 0.0052 0.0048 0.0030 0.0052
Notes: Multi-level clustered standard errors following Cameron et al. (2006) are
given in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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Table 18: Firm-level export/turnover and imports/intermediates ratio change, no NACE dummies.
2008S1–2009S1 2007S1–2008S1
Into the collapse Before the collapse
Coefficient Exports to Imports to Exports to Imports
Turnover Intermediates Turnover Intermediates
change change change change
Dsize -0.0211 -0.0380
c 0.1003a 0.0517a
(0.035) (0.021) (0.032) (0.019)
Dprod -0.0037 0.0373
c 0.0536c 0.0280
(0.033) (0.020) (0.030) (0.018)
Dinterm share 0.0264 -0.0108 0.0385 0.0505
a
(0.029) (0.019) (0.027) (0.016)
Dshare exp sales -0.1535
a 0.0439 -0.1366a -0.0087
(0.035) (0.036) (0.031) (0.030)
Dshare imp interm 0.0403 -0.1107
a 0.0057 -0.0192
(0.034) (0.019) (0.029) (0.016)
Dvalue add chain -0.0881
b -0.0635c -0.0453 0.0235
(0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.029)
Dext fin dep -0.0167 -0.0374
c -0.0867a 0.0081
(0.033) (0.020) (0.029) (0.017)
Dshare debts o liab -0.0074 -0.0050 0.0261 -0.0111
(0.031) (0.019) (0.028) (0.017)
Dshare debts due after one 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0511
c 0.0071
(0.032) (0.022) (0.030) (0.019)
Dshare fin debt -0.0391 0.0404
c -0.0221 -0.0028
(0.032) (0.022) (0.030) (0.019)
Dshare stock 0.0249 0.0145 0.0372 0.0115
(0.029) (0.018) (0.027) (0.016)
for 0.0242 0.0677c -0.1139b -0.0407
(0.043) (0.038) (0.047) (0.028)
mne -0.0120 -0.0151 0.0828c 0.0263
(0.049) (0.042) (0.044) (0.036)
Constant 0.1057b 0.0329 -0.0602 -0.1394a
(0.050) (0.033) (0.048) (0.028)
Observations 8,360 14,388 8,250 13,983
R2 0.0065 0.0046 0.0077 0.0018
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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Table 19: Exports and imports growth: firm, country, and product determinants, continuous variables.
2008S1–2009S1 2007S1–2008S1
Into the collapse Before the collapse
Coefficient Exports Imports Exports Imports




(0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Cprod 0.0100 0.0007 0.0251
a 0.0244a
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
Cinterm share -0.0032 -0.0095
c 0.0066 -0.0025
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Cshare exp sales 0.0019 -0.0244
a -0.0137b -0.0075
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Cshare imp interm 0.0070 -0.0119
b -0.0099b -0.0149a
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Cvalue add chain -0.0084 -0.0086 -0.0040 -0.0052
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
Cext fin dep 0.0097
c -0.0021 0.0047 0.0001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Cshare debts o liab -0.0027 -0.0078
b 0.0002 -0.0002
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Cshare debts due after one -0.0037 0.0093
c -0.0028 0.0083
(0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Cshare fin debt 0.0013 -0.0016 0.0090 -0.0059
(0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Cshare stock -0.0069 -0.0060 0.0076 0.0086
b
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003)
for -0.0494 0.0190 -0.0226 -0.0185
(0.030) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018)
mne -0.0074 -0.0303 0.0195 -0.0311
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023)
Country characteristics
OECD NO EU 0.1125a 0.1995a -0.1829a -0.2980a
(0.041) (0.021) (0.024) (0.035)
NO OECD NO EU 0.0030 0.1543a -0.0893a -0.2409a
(0.034) (0.042) (0.030) (0.033)
exch rate change -0.5017a -0.1273b -0.2999a -0.2709a
(0.109) (0.063) (0.076) (0.078)
growth rate GDP 0.0235a 0.0060 0.0143a 0.0070b
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Product characteristics
intermediates -0.0477b -0.0615a 0.0047 -0.0243c
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.013)
capital goods -0.1027a -0.0800a -0.0261 -0.0359
(0.026) (0.017) (0.026) (0.031)
consumer durables -0.1082a -0.0946a -0.0081 -0.0332
(0.036) (0.019) (0.044) (0.023)
energy -0.0700c 0.0411 0.0588 -0.0297
(0.042) (0.035) (0.064) (0.062)
residual -0.0317 -0.0531a -0.0007 -0.0535c
(0.025) (0.011) (0.029) (0.027)
fraclib diff 0.0083 0.0248
b -0.0231 -0.0224c
(0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012)
Constant -0.2309 -0.1376c -0.0076 0.2689a
(0.148) (0.075) (0.084) (0.078)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 162,456 224,081 159,991 221,401
R2 0.0079 0.0070 0.0050 0.0059
Notes: Multi-level clustered standard errors following Cameron et al. (2006) are
given in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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Table 20: Firm-level export/turnover and imports/intermediates ratio change, continuous variables.
2008S1–2009S1 2007S1–2008S1
Into the collapse Before the collapse
Coefficient Exports to Imports to Exports to Imports
Turnover Intermediates Turnover Intermediates
change change change change
Csize -0.0349
b -0.0220c 0.0295c 0.0190
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
Cprod -0.0034 0.0291
b 0.0336b 0.0030
(0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
Cinterm share -0.0167 -0.0189 0.0200 0.0598
a
(0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013)
Cshare exp sales -0.0663
a 0.0024 -0.0584a 0.0118
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
Cshare imp interm -0.0054 -0.0690
a -0.0113 -0.0153
(0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011)
Cvalue add chain 0.0263
a 0.0075 0.0079 -0.0066
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Cext fin dep -0.0055 -0.0043 -0.0050 0.0012
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Cshare debts o liab -0.0184 0.0009 -0.0081 -0.0128
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
Cshare debts due after one 0.0138 0.0002 0.0267
c 0.0233c
(0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
Cshare fin debt -0.0165 0.0052 -0.0116 -0.0089
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
Cshare stock 0.0051 0.0298
b 0.0018 -0.0236c
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
for -0.0480 0.1036b -0.1018b -0.0537
(0.038) (0.043) (0.040) (0.036)
mne -0.0081 0.0309 0.0286 0.0302
(0.036) (0.040) (0.042) (0.045)
Constant 0.2500c 0.1147 0.0185 -0.2267b
(0.128) (0.134) (0.122) (0.100)
NACE dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,886 13,694 7,785 13,307
R2 0.0166 0.0134 0.0169 0.0107
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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